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Arguments in favor of open services markets are 
becoming increasingly set forth worldwide. This 
applies in particular to key enabling sectors such as 
financial services, telecommunications, and trans-
portation, which contribute centrally to a nation’s 
overall economic development. At the same time, 
the difficulties of opening services markets to foreign 
competition are becoming evident. Thus, because 
doing so involves a broad and complex set of poli-
cies, regulatory instruments, institutions and con-
stituencies, domestic and foreign as well as public 
and private. Experience has shown that considerable 
care must be given to the assessment of the nature, 
pace and sequencing of regulatory reform and liber-
alization in order to meaningfully enhance a nation’s 
economic growth and development.
Not surprisingly, and despite the experience that has 
been gained from more than two decades of negotia-
tions at the multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral 
levels, trade in services continues to rank among 
the most complex subject matters in modern trade 
diplomacy. Such complexity arises from a number 
of factors, including: (i) the intangible nature of 
service-sector activity, and the corresponding dif-
ficulty of measuring and assessing a sector’s contribu-
tion to production and exchange and the economic 
consequences of alternative policy choices; (ii) the 
considerable diversity of activities encompassed in a 
sector; (iii) the challenge of factor mobility (capital 
and labor) involved in services transactions; and 
(iv) the ubiquity (and diversity) of market failures 
affecting services transactions and related regulatory 
intensity.
Both their central intermediation functions and 
the impact of competitiveness on a nation’s overall 
economic performance suggest the possibility of far-
reaching benefits from the liberalization of services 
trade and investment. Numerous studies have in 
recent years documented the potential magnitude of 
these benefits, which are typically seen as exceeding 
those emanating from the full opening of trade in 
agricultural and manufacturing products.1 To date, 
however, the benefits of pro-competitive reform in 
services markets have tended to be realized more 
through unilateral efforts at the domestic level than 
through collective action at the trade negotiating 
table, be it at the WTO or under preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs).
It is well known that the WTO’s Doha Develop-
ment Agenda (DDA) negotiations have encountered 
recurring difficulties and at the time of writing 
(February 2009) have yet to be concluded. Part of 
the problem can clearly be traced to the fact the 
negotiations have focused centrally (and perhaps 
excessively) on trade-offs between agriculture and 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA). At the 
same time, there is little doubt that slow progress 
in the services discussions is due to the challenges 
faced by a majority of WTO members in mastering 
the regulatory intricacies of the service sector and in 
devising a proper role for services in national devel-
opment strategies.
Absent such a roadmap and confronted with general-
ly weak negotiating, regulatory and implementation 
capacities, developing country members of the WTO 
are often especially handicapped in their ability to 
engage meaningfully in services negotiations. More 
often than not, such difficulties translate into negoti-
See Hoekman and Mattoo (2009), and Hoekman (2006).
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ating stances and levels of bound commitments that 
connote considerable precaution. The end result is 
that the development potential of services trade and 
negotiations in the sector fail to be properly har-
nessed. Addressing the above challenges through tar-
geted technical assistance and capacity strengthening 
therefore must be part of the solution. While perhaps 
not of crucial importance, the question is whether 
the difficulties lie within the structure of the WTO 
multilateral negotiations, or within the problematic 
efforts of the developing countries’ efforts themselves.
Building on the work of Feketekuty (2008), the 
main aim of this report is to provide a practical 
checklist to help services negotiators, officials in 
ministries and regulatory agencies, and the broad 
stakeholder communities (including those inside 
the World Bank and in aid agencies) to gain a better 
sense of the key “moments” in the life cycle of ser-
vices negotiations. These moments are as follows:
mapping •	  a strategy for services in national devel-
opment plans;
preparing •	  for services negotiations (i.e., develop-
ing an informed negotiating strategy or identify-
ing the capacity needs required to do so; setting 
up the proper channels of communication with 
key stakeholders; and conducting a trade-related 
regulatory audit);
conducting •	  a services negotiation (i.e., acquiring 
a voice in debates on outstanding rule-making 
challenges in services trade by pursuing offen-
sive interests; devising strategies to deal with 
defensive concerns; analyzing the negotiating 
requests of trading partners; formulating own 
requests and offers; and participating in collec-
tive requests and offers);
implementing  •	 negotiated outcomes (i.e., ad-
dressing regulatory capacities and weaknesses; 
and identifying implementation bottlenecks); 
and
supplying •	  newly-opened markets with competi-
tive and international standard-compliant ser-
vices (i.e., addressing supply-side constraints on 
the ability to take full advantage of the outcome 
of trade negotiations, including aid-for-trade in 
services).
In what follows, this report focus in Section II on 
mapping a strategy for services in national devel-
opment plans. Section III is devoted to preparing 
for services negotiations, Section IV to conducting 
services negotiations, Section V to enhancing the 
capacity to supply, and Section VI to aid-for-trade in 
services. Conclusions are in Section VII. There are 
several boxes and two tables in the Appendix that 
provide illustrative examples of the many key points 
that need to be considered in planning, implement-
ing, and evaluating a program of services negotia-
tions especially in emerging market and developing 
economies.3
2
Mapping a Strategy for Services in 
National Development Plans
In embarking on services negotiations, governments 
must clarify at the domestic level the broad policy 
objectives they wish to achieve. This implies deter-
mining the extent to which such agreements are used 
as an anchor of ongoing policy reforms and/or as 
precursors of future reforms, notably via a pre-com-
mitment to future market opening. The idea here 
is to gain a greater sense of the likely opportunity 
costs flowing from various approaches to liberaliza-
tion and policy bindings under services agreements, 
including the choice not to make new or improved 
binding commitments, thereby preserving policy 
space for the future.
The heterogeneity of services and their essentially in-
tangible nature pose daunting challenges to services 
negotiators. Governments tend to think of services 
in a piecemeal, segmented manner that often reflects 
more the particular characteristics of individual sec-
tors than their role in the overall economy. Such a 
tendency can be seen in the (generally disorganized) 
way in which many governments tend to tackle 
services issues. There are probably few governments 
that have a “Ministry of Services,” while most, if 
not all, have numerous sectoral ministries dealing 
with individual service sectors. These may include: 
financial services via a Ministry of Finance or of the 
Economy; telecommunication services via a Ministry 
of Communications (which can also include postal 
services, broadcasting and audiovisual services); a 
Ministry of Transportation, and so forth. Many 
services-related issues also involve more than one 
ministry or government agency. This is notably the 
case in regard to the movement of natural persons 
and trade in professional services, which in many 
countries is concomitantly the competence of the 
Ministries of External Relations, Justice, Education 
and Immigration (when the latter is separate from 
other ministries).
Developing a clear strategy for services therefore 
poses, for most governments, genuine institutional 
challenges to the extent that no single agency takes a 
holistic view of services and their interlinked contri-
bution to the development and growth process. Ac-
cordingly, any attempt to devise a service-sector road 
map or strategic blueprint must start with setting up 
a cross-sectoral, multi-issue steering committee and 
designating the coordinating function to a specific 
ministry, secretariat, agency or personality within 
the government that will be empowered to identify 
key elements of a services road map and oversee its 
implementation. Such a coordination function is far 
from trivial, since it cuts across bureaucratic compe-
tencies (so-called “regulatory turf”) and can poten-
tially create conflicts between sectoral and economy-
wide perspectives.
Considering the economy-wide implications of 
service-sector reforms, coordination should ideally 
take place as close as possible at the highest levels 
of government (e.g., the office of the presidency or 
of the prime minister) or derive from them a clear 
delegation of power. Sectoral ministries naturally 
focus on the design and implementation of optimal 
policy for each individual sector under their jurisdic-
tion. The establishment of a national development 
strategy, however, requires that services be thought 
of in economy-wide terms. Governments should 
seek to identify growth and development bottle-
necks in the economy and direct policy efforts at 
overcoming the bottlenecks and deciding what, if 
any, role can be assigned to trade-and-investment 
policy in this process. One approach is to look at Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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The cost of not opening up or of doing so in a manner that 
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preserves greater policy space—e.g., via fewer legally-binding com-
mitments or via commitments that favor some forms of entry over 
others (i.e., minority joint ventures vs. majority foreign ownership, 
Greenfield investment vs. purchases of existing (national) firms, etc.) 
needs to be looked at from various perspectives. These include the 
impact on access to capital, resulting investment levels, the nature 
and extent of contestability in key sectors, the level of competitive-
ness in particular sectors and the overall economy as well as in export 
markets, access to distribution channels, and the capacity to create 
and innovate.
productive chains (activities) or clusters (location)—
concepts that go beyond individual sectors. This 
takes into account the interface between services and 
the industries to which they provide critical inputs, 
with a view to evaluating the role of service-sector 
policy in such a broader context. For instance, if 
for a particular supply chain, the main problem is 
logistics and transportation, this implies a particular 
set of solutions that clearly involve a range of service 
sectors. If, on the contrary, the main bottleneck is 
the access to imported components, the issue points 
to trade in goods and the workings of a country’s 
“traditional” (goods-related) foreign-trade regime. In 
other instances, the binding constraint may concern 
the supply of skilled workers, pointing to the need 
for enhanced efforts in education and training and 
the possible scope for attracting foreign investment 
in higher or specialized education services.
With an economy-wide map in hand, governments 
can then more easily focus on—and prioritize—
services-related policy responses. In each case, 
governments will need to determine whether the 
best solution to a particular problem involves techni-
cal support (financial and otherwise), strengthened 
regulation, enhanced efforts at investment pro-
motion, targeted efforts at trade and investment 
liberalization, or greater transparency and certainty 
in domestic policy-making.
Unlike other sectors of the economy, services involve 
a host of national policy objectives, such as pruden-
tial regulation, universal access, the preservation 
of cultural diversity, or the maintenance of high 
professional standards. These objectives have to be 
clearly defined and factored into the analysis as well. 
The boundaries between public and private interests 
may also need to be properly delineated, notably in 
the context of public-private partnerships that are 
increasingly common in service sectors such as infra-
structure and transportation. Finally, the boundary 
of state sovereignty almost invariably comes into 
play in service-policy discussions to the extent that 
services negotiations encompass foreign-investment 
liberalization. The latter includes the possibility of 
foreign presence and involvement in particularly 
sensitive sectors.
Any consistent approach to services policy in na-
tional development strategies needs to focus on the 
pace and manner in which a country wishes to inte-
grate itself into the world economy. The revolution 
in communications and information technologies, 
and the compression in time and distance that has 
come in its wake, have transformed the world into 
a fast-moving and interconnected community. This 
can greatly facilitate the scope for “plugging into” 
regional or global supply chains, and it allows coun-
tries to leapfrog what used to be difficult technologi-
cal constraints on development. But it also requires 
quick responses to emerging social and economic 
challenges. Measuring the costs and benefits of open-
ing up and integrating more fully into production 
networks needs to be ascertained alongside the cost 
of not doing so, or of doing so at a different pace 
or through different means.2 The effects of various 
policy choices on employment and restructuring, the 
possible impacts on “national champions” and other 
strategic considerations thus need to be properly 
identified and measured.
The checklist in Box A.1 below emanates from 
considerations made so far with respect to whether, 
how, and in what manner services and service sector 
policy (including trade policy in services) are situ-
ated in national development strategies:5
3 Preparing for Services Negotiations
The international organizations include: World Bank Insti-
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tute; United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD); International Trade Centre (ITC); and the WTO. The 
regional organizations include: Organization of American States; the 
Inter-American Development Bank; the European Commission or 
the Asian Development Bank; UNESCAP; and ECLAC.
Despite its innate promise, the multiple challenges 
that liberalizing services trade entails cannot be 
underestimated, particularly in light of the limited 
administrative and negotiating capacities of many 
developing countries. A country needs to gather 
significant knowledge before it can submit sensible 
liberalization requests to its key trading partners and 
make informed market-opening offers. In addition 
to putting in place the proper channels of commu-
nication with key stakeholders inside and outside 
the government as well as preparing a full inventory 
of relevant measures to ensure full knowledge of the 
regulatory regime and its possible shortcomings (see 
below), governments need to identify opportunities 
and challenges for their exporters, determine the 
capacity building needs of the negotiators, minis-
tries, and regulatory agencies, and assess the likely 
economic and social impacts of various liberalization 
scenarios. These are challenging tasks even for devel-
oped country governments whose resources, human 
and financial, are typically far greater than those of 
developing countries. 
Much capacity-building effort in services has to date 
focused on helping developing country negotiators 
and policy officials master the legal provisions of 
services agreements such as the GATS. For many 
least developed countries (LDCs) and small and 
vulnerable economies (SVEs) as well as a number 
of countries seeking admission to the WTO, this 
remains an important task, particularly as their trade 
expertise is especially weak or embodied in very few 
officials inside trade and foreign ministries. Regu-
latory agencies and other ministries have usually 
even less capacity. Short-term training directed at 
overcoming these knowledge gaps can be useful in 
many countries, and international organizations and 
regional organizations are heavily involved in this 
type of TRTA (Trade-Related Technical Assistance)3 
delivery. The latter typically focus their TRTA efforts 
on preferential liberalization initiatives, whereas the 
former (with the exception of the WTO) tend to 
focus on both multilateral and preferential liberaliza-
tion endeavors.
A more pressing TRTA need, which is arguably more 
conducive to harnessing the pro-development poten-
tial of services liberalization, goes beyond GATS and 
the intricacies of trade agreements covering ser-
vices. Such a need concerns how best to acquire the 
analytical tools to determine a country’s readiness: 
to liberalize; develop government-wide negotiating 
strategies; assess the gender, poverty alleviation, and 
human health impacts of market opening in services; 
and help domestic service providers to take full 
advantage of the market access opportunities arising 
from regional and multilateral liberalization efforts. 
Technical assistance and training efforts directed to 
these issues have not yet materialized in a sustained 
manner, and they deserve far greater and immediate 
attention
For the most part, this entails the documentation (in 
the form of country/region and sector-specific case 
studies) and dissemination of knowledge on best 
practice in both developed and developing countries. 
North-South and South-South learning are equally 
important channels, and such a diversity of exper-Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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tise is more easily achieved through international 
organizations than through bilateral donors from the 
OECD area.
Negotiating without a  
Proper Services Road Map
Ideally, preparing for international negotiations 
should come after the establishment of national 
development strategies. That is often not the case, as 
countries become involved in negotiating processes 
that cannot wait for overall national policy positions 
to be determined. This is why many developing 
countries often have a feeling of precariousness when 
negotiating—a sense that they are not ready, both 
from a political and an administrative perspective, to 
respond to the complex regulatory and policy issues 
that arise in services negotiations. It is particularly 
the case when negotiations involve more mature 
partner countries that are likely to formulate highly 
informed negotiating demands
For developing countries, international negotiations 
often become a leading driver of domestic economic 
reforms, requiring the formulation of policy posi-
tions in areas where a domestic consensus for change 
has yet to take root, or where domestic regulatory 
conditions are insufficiently developed. Moreover, 
in many developing countries, an appropriate level 
of regulation and attendant regulatory capacity have 
often failed to materialize by the time such coun-
tries are confronted—in the context of asymmetri-
cal negotiations—with the need to adapt, update, 
reform, or even adopt nascent regulatory regimes. 
The lack of previous experience with regulatory 
reforms renders the search for policy responses even 
more difficult. The problem is further aggravated by 
the speed of international negotiations, which usu-
ally proceed at a faster pace than domestic political 
change is wanted or even feasible.
The task of preparing for international negotiations 
is thus an exercise in adaptation and approximation. 
While governments should ideally know what they 
want from negotiations before they negotiate, there 
is typically little time available for such an assess-
ment. Thus, the only remaining option is often 
to progressively identify the objectives during the 
negotiating process. Negotiations in this sense require 
clarifying and eventually rectifying sub-optimal 
regulatory situations and mapping out proper 
sequences between internal regulatory reform and 
external liberalization. The position a country takes 
in negotiations, however, will reflect an equilibrium 
between the demanded (by trading partners) and the 
acceptable (by domestic politics).
Inter-governmental Coordination 
and Multi-Stakeholder 
Consultations
In preparing for services negotiations, as in the 
establishment of a national development strategy for 
services, an important first step is to set up a cred-
ible, transparent, and efficient coordination process 
for the work at hand. In the case of trade negotia-
tions, such coordination often rests with foreign 
and/or trade ministries—typically the ministries 
responsible for conducting the negotiations them-
selves. Intra-governmental coordination counts 
among the most crucial of negotiating inputs—an 
issue of such importance that it alone is liable to 
determine the effectiveness of a country’s participa-
tion in international negotiations. The last thing a 
government wants is for different ministries and/or 
agencies to be saying different things about the same 
set of negotiations or, worse yet, for trading partners 
to be confused as to where negotiating authority and 
accountability are ultimately vested.
The main objective of internal coordination is the 
establishment of national positions regarding all 
service-related issues dealt with in specific negotia-
tions. A secondary objective is the achievement of 
consistency and coherence in the way a particular 
country or government manages its external trade 
environment. This is an important demand placed 
on coordinating agencies since it requires an ad-
ditional check on positions taken across various 
fora and negotiating settings (e.g., WTO vs. PTAs). 
While coordinating for WTO-GATS negotiations, 
for example, a government will need to be mind-
ful of positions taken or interests pursued in other 
negotiating fora, and to seek overall consistency and 
coherence. This refers not only to scheduled com-
mitments governing access to a country’s services 
market but also to positions regarding rules and 
principles, which may vary across agreements and/or 
negotiating processes. That is, positive vs. negative 
lists, sectors and/or disciplines that may be covered 7
Preparing for Services Negotiations 
To help with the process of consultation, the International Trade 
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Centre of UNCTAD/WTO has published a useful ìGATS Consulta-
tion Kit,î which contains a series of questions organised in three 
groupings: (a) barriers encountered related to the general principles 
in the GATS, (b) barriers encountered by mode of supply, and (c) 
possible market access impediments encountered in domestic regula-
tions and their implementation. These questions may need to be 
adapted to make sure that all the information needed to assess the 
impact of services liberalization and to formulate requests and offers 
is being captured in the consultation process. See ITC (1999). 
in PTAs but not at the WTO level, such as digital 
trade/e-commerce and government procurement of 
services. Box A.2 highlights some of the policy-mak-
ing benefits likely to derive from an effective process 
of intra-governmental consultations in services trade.
Various options are available to governments in 
structuring internal policy dialogues and decision-
making processes in services trade. One structure 
used by a number of WTO Members is the creation 
of dedicated “Working Groups” established under 
the Trade/Commerce Ministry to co-ordinate trade 
negotiations. Depending on available resources, 
Members could have a single group for services, or 
a number of different Working Groups covering 
related services sectors (e.g., one group on recre-
ation/sports/entertainment and tourism; another on 
transport, distribution, and communications, etc.). 
Governments with limited resources may wish to fo-
cus on creating groups for selected service sectors—
although this may raise challenges as service sectors 
are often highly inter-related. Working Groups could 
also be considered for issues that are relevant across 
a range of sectors, such as Mode 4 and labor-force 
development, or possibilities for cross-border and 
e-trade in services. Participants in such groups may 
to some extent self-select based on the relevance 
of the issue to their responsibilities (e.g., immigra-
tion authorities would have a clear interest in being 
involved in Mode 4 discussions; telecommunications 
authorities less so).
While governments must ultimately assume the 
responsibility of carrying out their country’s trade-
negotiating strategy, the legitimacy for this will only 
be secured if the coordination effort expands to 
include all key external stakeholders in the process, 
that is, the private sector and civil society at large. 
The task is here again challenging since the conduct 
of multi-stakeholder consultations often involves a 
broad variety of potentially conflicting interests—
ranging from mercantilistic export interests to con-
cerns over consumer protection or the preservation 
of a country’s cultural heritage. Although govern-
ments at times regard such a consultative process as 
unduly onerous and potentially constraining of its 
sovereign decision-making prerogatives, the backing 
of key affected constituencies may be necessary when 
it comes to ratifying and implementing negotiated 
outcomes.4
Effective consultation is ideally an ongoing, two-
way process—i.e., stakeholders provide initial input 
and receive initial feedback, then comment on 
negotiating alternatives, and receive feedback on the 
negotiations as they progress. If the consultation is 
only one-way, exporter stakeholders may soon lose 
interest and critics or groups with a defensive or 
rent-protecting agenda may gain disproportionate 
influence.
Figure 1 below shows the policy-decision matrix 
used by the Ministry of Commerce in Thailand in 
preparation for the various negotiations in which 
it participates. The matrix reveals the country’s 
recognition of the need for policy decisions to rest 
on sound analytical inputs and an extensive consul-
tation process within and outside government, with 
a view to ensuring that Thailand pursues a coordi-
nated and coherent set of objectives across various 
negotiating fora.
Table A.1 below indicates the main private and 
public stakeholders to consider for various service 
sectors.
In general, public consultations should aim to bring 
together stakeholders with differing views so that 
individual groups are exposed to the full range of 
factors that the government must take into account 
and balance in the negotiating process. In addi-
tion, it may be helpful to confront domestic service 
exporters with consumer and producer interests as 
well as those of service importers and public-interest 
groups in public debates. The actual economic and 
political consequences of trade and investment 
liberalization in services trade and attendant regula-
tory-reform issues should thereby be clarified. Such 
debates may help to address possible misconceptions 
and misunderstandings in the public-policy debate 
over liberalization and reform issues.1
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Services play a very important role in the lives of all citizens, so it is 
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important to have consumer and user voices represented. Transna-
tional NGOs may have the resources to provide excellent briefings 
on economic and social impacts in general. However, it will be 
important to ensure that representatives of such groups are from the 
domestic economy and are well versed in the actual circumstances 
for consumers in the particular country. Equally, operators in other 
sectors of the economy—such as agriculture or manufacturing—are 
important consumers of services (e.g., transportation or financial 
services). The interests of local manufacturers or producers who 
could benefit from the domestic liberalization of services, including 
manufacturers that provide bundled solutions of goods and services, 
should also be represented. 
The mix of stakeholders therefore needs to be as 
broad and representative as possible, even though 
it may make debate more controversial. It may also 
have to reflect a balance between institutions of a 
national and sub-national character, depending on 
the weight of such types of institutions in each case. 
A balance will further need to be struck between 
institutions that are more horizontal in nature (e.g., 
a chamber of commerce representing several sectoral 
interests) and those of a more narrowly sectoral char-
acter (e.g., the banking federation or individual pro-
fessional service associations). However, as in govern-
ment, it is still relatively rare for the private sector, 
particularly in developing countries, to be organized 
around all-inclusive coalitions and/or other types 
of groupings dealing with services. As noted above, 
given the key intermediary role many services play 
for the entire economy, it will be particularly helpful 
to reach out to consumer communities (including in 
the agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors), 
and not solely to focus on the negotiating prefer-
ences of service producers.5 To this end, building up 
capacity among consumer-advocacy organizations, 
or supporting their creation, may be of considerable 
use in promoting pro-competitive, consumer-friend-
ly outcomes in policy design.
A particularly sensitive issue is the balance to be 
struck in consultations among business associations, 
trade unions, and non-governmental actors (NGOs). 
The latter in particular will tend to take vocal posi-
tions on a number of significant matters pertaining 
to services trade—often questioning the very benefits 
of liberalization itself, and cautioning against the 
treatment of services with “public good” character-
istics (e.g., education, health, water distribution, 
cultural industries).
Drawing once more on the experience of Thailand’s 
Ministry of Commerce, Figure 2 below illustrates 
the continuum of inter-agency and external stake-
Source: Vonkhorporn (2008).
Figure 1. Trade Policy Formulation Checklist in ThailandChamber of 
   Commerce
Bank Association
Individual 
   companies
Affected 
     companies
Consumers
Academia
NGOs
Federation of
    Industries
Finance
Transport
Health
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Preparing for Services Negotiations 
holder consultations needed to make services nego-
tiations successful.
Conducting a Trade-related 
Regulatory Audit6
Since the very currency of services negotiations con-
sists of domestic regulation, much of the preparatory 
work will need to focus on the domestic regulatory 
regime and its relevance in a trade policy context: 
how it is framed; what objectives are pursued; 
and with what degree of efficiency; how domestic 
regulatory requirements are rooted in international 
standards or international best practice; how user-
friendly domestic rules and administrative proce-
dures are; how and by whom domestic regulations 
are applied; how trade- and investment-friendly do-
mestic regulatory regimes are; and whether domestic 
regulatory objectives can be attained in ways that are 
less restrictive in trade and investment.
An inventory audit of domestic regulatory measures 
“affecting services and trade in services” should be 
compiled on the basis of existing legislation and 
regulations. Such an internal exercise will strengthen 
inter-agency coordination and help promote a 
healthy dialogue between officials involved in 
domestic and external policy matters while also pro-
moting a culture of regulatory reform and regulatory 
impact assessment. Thus, a trade-related audit can 
be very useful even in the absence of international 
negotiations.
Trade and investment negotiations, however, offer 
excellent, ready-made, opportunities for engaging in 
such an exercise. This, in turn, helps to address the 
need for investments in trade-related capacity among 
regulatory officials who may have limited knowledge 
or experience about international agreements, trade 
law, and negotiating processes. It can also help en-
hance knowledge among trade officials who may not 
have a full understanding of the underlying law and 
economics of sectoral regulatory challenges.
As noted in Box A.3 below, performing an audit of 
all service-related regulation can prove a daunting 
task, particularly in light of the fact that such an 
exercise may typically exceed the scope of measures 
subject to services-trade negotiations. This is why 
Source: Vonkhorporn (2008).
The following section draws on Sauvé (2008). 
6 
Figure 2. Negotiating Essentials: Inter-agency Coordination and External 
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enhancing the ability of government officials to gain 
a fuller understanding of trade law is particularly im-
portant, if for no other reason than to properly iden-
tify and circumscribe what and how domestic regula-
tory conduct may legitimately be expected to arise in 
international trade discussions and distinguish that 
from more purely domestic matters of non-discrim-
inatory conduct. Regulatory officials naturally tend 
to view their work as primarily domestic in nature. 
Yet the advent of trade disciplines on services in the 
GATS and in a growing number of PTAs has clearly 
revealed that much of what regulators consider do-
mestic in nature potentially lies within the perimeter 
of trade and investment negotiations.
Box A.4 provides concrete illustrations of what a 
regulatory trade audit typically generates by way 
of information. It will be evident that this listing 
closely tracks the information required in producing 
a negative list of non-conforming trade and invest-
ment measures.
Governments responsible for coordinating the 
preparatory work for negotiations should aim to 
gather an inventory of measures that will enable 
them to seek answers to at least a few basic policy 
questions:
whether the existing regulation or regulatory  •	
regime is adequate and/or acceptable or whether 
it needs changing;
whether any needed changes can be contem- •	
plated within the time frame of ongoing interna-
tional negotiations;
whether regulatory changes can be “offered” in  •	
international negotiations.
The above elements are important for several 
reasons. First, offers in services negotiations may 
require the binding of existing regulatory situa-
tions, and countries should avoid scheduling legally 
binding measures that domestic regulators do not 
find adequate or fully developed. At the same time, 
changes to domestic regulation that may be needed 
or contemplated for internal or domestic politi-
cal reasons may in fact constitute valuable offers to 
make in the negotiations if they tend to improve on 
market-access or national-treatment conditions—as 
defined in most international agreements. Why not 
then promote formal changes and offer them while 
there is still time to (seek to) obtain reciprocal con-
cessions from major trading partners?
Some of the key questions that arise in the prepara-
tory phase of services negotiations are noted in Box 
A.5.11
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Services negotiations tend to be complex affairs—in 
tandem with the sectors involved. A first concern for 
governments in conducting services negotiations is 
how the talks are actually going to be organized and 
to identify key issues that will require attention early 
on. Since services negotiations involve a number 
of important but highly heterogeneous sectors, the 
question of composing delegations for negotiating 
meetings is crucial, all the more so given the budget-
ary constraints most developing countries face, and 
that sector-specific expertise cannot realistically be 
maintained in Geneva. This implies a minute moni-
toring of the negotiating process and a good means of 
information going back in capitals so as to maintain 
relevant officials ready for participation when needed.
The conduct of services negotiations essentially 
involves the mastery of two key issues—rule-making 
and market-opening, both of which (and especially 
market opening) need to rest on continuous coordi-
nation and consultation with key stakeholders inside 
and outside government.
Making Rules for Services Trade
The initial emphasis in services negotiations will 
often be placed on rule-making issues, a phase of 
negotiations that may encompass a diverse set of 
issues—old and new. These will typically range from 
the approach to be taken: for scheduling commit-
ments (i.e., top-down/negative list or bottom-up/
hybrid list or a combination of the two); to the 
scope and definition issues and the unfinished rule-
making agenda of GATS (i.e., domestic regulation, 
emergency safeguards, government procurement 
and subsidies), which remains for the most part an 
unmet challenge at the PTA level as well.
Rule-making discussions will also typically feature a 
number of more frontier issues, including: whether 
and how to address e-commerce and digital trade 
more broadly in services negotiations; whether and 
how to address matters of cultural cooperation (with 
or without legally-binding market access commit-
ments); whether and how to ring-fence sectors, such 
as public health and education, where specific “pub-
lic goods”-related concerns may predominate; the 
need to design pro-competitive regulatory provisions 
to open up trade and investment in network indus-
tries; the need for competition-policy complements 
to market opening in selected sectors prone to mar-
ket dominance and anti-competitive conduct; the 
specific treatment of investment in service industries 
(a central challenge in PTAs featuring comprehen-
sive investment chapters); how best to enhance the 
treatment of labor mobility; agreeing on operational 
aid for trade modalities for services, etc.
Many developing country governments regard them-
selves as essentially “rule-takers” in trade negotia-
tions, including in the services field. And they find 
themselves thus taking a relatively passive stance in 
discussions on rule-making issues. This tendency 
may be even more pronounced at the PTA level, 
particularly when negotiations are conducted along 
North-South lines and where developed country 
governments often come to the negotiating table 
with a pre-determined platform of rules and substan-
tive obligations, with only limited scope for negotia-
tion, modification, and/or innovation.
Yet, while the above negotiating asymmetries are an 
unfortunate fact of life in trade diplomacy, develop-
ing countries have a major stake in the crafting of 
rules governing services trade. For this reason, they Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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need to exhibit a more pro-active stance in such 
talks and strive to identify, formulate, and defend 
their own proposals in areas of priority interest. At 
the WTO level, as well as in regional negotiations, 
they must also reach out more to other developing 
countries in pooling scarce negotiating resources and 
building coalitions in support of specific issues (in 
particular, Mode 4 trade, e-commerce/cross-border 
supply, emergency safeguards, and special and dif-
ferential treatment).
Developing countries should especially participate 
in the ongoing discussions on the interface between 
domestic regulation and external liberalization—the 
so-called GATS Article VI:4 work program. This is 
so as strengthened regulatory disciplines may help 
to promote sounder overall governance and greater 
transparency in domestic markets, with attendant 
signaling externalities. Stronger disciplines on do-
mestic regulation can also provide an effective means 
of challenging regulatory practices in foreign markets 
that are needlessly burdensome or serve as disguised 
restrictions to trade.
Technical assistance and capacity building efforts 
targeted at helping developing country negotiators 
to acquire a greater voice—through greater techni-
cal expertise—in services rule-making may thus be 
particularly useful. The broad pool of former services 
negotiators, particularly those from leading develop-
ing countries, needs to be harnessed more resolutely 
to this end. This could usefully be done through the 
establishment of a roster of experts that the World 
Bank or regional development banks could admin-
ister. In addition, developing country governments 
could team up with NGOs and policy-research orga-
nizations that have developed considerable technical 
expertise in the services field, outsourcing part or all 
of the crafting of rule-making proposals to the latter.
Opening Services Markets
While the rule-making agenda in services remains sig-
nificant and of continued importance to all members 
of the trade community, much of the attention in ser-
vices negotiations is devoted to the question of market 
opening and specific liberalization commitments.
Unlike discussions on non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA) or agriculture, services negotiations have so 
far largely eschewed formulas (linear or non-linear), 
coefficients or thresholds for the negotiations, as in-
dicated in Box A.6 below. This reflects the particular 
difficulty of quantifying non-tariff (i.e., regulatory) 
barriers to trade and investment. Absent formula-
based approaches, governments continue to conduct 
negotiations based on the exchange of market-access 
and national-treatment commitments on a sectoral 
and mode-of-supply-specific basis, with occasional 
(and increasing) use being made of GATS Article 
XVIII (Additional Commitments). The latter relates 
to pre-committing or phasing-in future market 
openings, allowing for a smoother transition towards 
greater market openness and attendant structural 
adjustment challenges.
Opening services markets typically involves a 
considerable number of policy parameters, and 
various layers of impediments, some of which may 
be overlapping. Many of these impediments will be 
narrowly sectoral in character and relate to a host 
of regulatory measures that may potentially affect 
the quality and certainty of access to, and presence 
in, services markets. Secondly, many other policy 
parameters may not be sector-specific but relate to 
more generic or horizontal policy measures (e.g., 
investment, labor mobility). And thirdly, still other 
policy measures may lie wholly outside the remit 
of what is often considered as the central focus of 
services negotiations (e.g., standards-related issues; 
competition policy; access to government procure-
ment markets). 
An important question confronting governments 
in the context of request-offer negotiations con-
cerns the level of ambition at which legally bind-
ing commitments can be scheduled under services 
agreements. The choice of what to bind is likely to 
have important implications for domestic economic 
performance and regulatory conduct. For instance, 
the impact of de novo liberalization (i.e., implying 
the elimination or progressive reduction of existing 
restrictions to trade or investment in services)—on 
competition, the likely response of foreign direct 
investors, domestic incumbents, employment levels, 
the design of domestic regulatory regimes—is likely 
to differ significantly from the potential impact flow-
ing from a decision to bind the regulatory status quo 
(i.e., to freeze the current level of policy restrictive-
ness) or indeed to bind at a level below the regula-13
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While all WTO Members suffer an information deficit in services 
7 
negotiations, many developing countries can be at a particular disad-
vantage, lacking the large network of embassies, organized industry 
associations (coalitions of services industries), foreign affiliates of 
home-country chambers of commerce, and even individual company 
presence in local markets from which many developed countries can 
source information. Such uneven access to information means that 
the negotiating requests emanating from some developed-country 
partners tend to be more highly specific in nature, focusing on 
previously identified and rank-ordered, sector-specific, or horizontal 
measures whose progressive elimination or liberalization is being 
sought. Many developing countries are unlikely to be in a position 
to make similar types of requests, particularly in the early stages of 
the request-offer process. This tends to place these countries in an 
inherently defensive posture, and leads to commitment patterns that 
display considerable precaution and may be of limited development 
benefit to host nations and lacking significant commercial value to 
exporting nations. 
For a fuller discussion of the services-export potential of developing 
8 
countries, see OECD (2003). 
tory status quo (which the GATS and GATS-like 
agreements allow).
In deciding the type of access to request and/or offer, 
three core issues will typically need to be addressed: 
the benefits to be achieved; the political concerns/
downsides; required regulatory frameworks or 
regulatory reform efforts. Table A.2 lists a number 
of important policy considerations likely to inform 
the formulation of negotiating requests and offers. 
Given perceived shortcomings in regulatory regimes 
and external competitiveness, developing countries 
tend to focus much negotiating energy on defensive 
interests—i.e., the protection of the home market 
from foreign competition through limited market-
opening offers. This comes at the cost of offensive 
interests in key export markets. A first reason for 
such a negotiating stance lies in the pronounced 
asymmetries that characterize the conduct of services 
negotiations and that are rooted in capacity and 
informational deficits that are often more substantial 
in poorer countries.7 These relate to the genuine 
difficulties most developing country governments 
experience in collecting information on regulatory 
barriers maintained in foreign markets that hamper 
the growth of home-country suppliers. Another 
reason stems from the sensitivities in offering foreign 
interests enhanced access to a country’s market, or 
in placing foreign services and service suppliers on 
an equal regulatory footing with domestic competi-
tors. A third reason for defensive posturing traces its 
origin to the very demands that developed coun-
tries often put on their negotiation partner, forcing 
the latter to focus their energy on responding to 
those demands. A fourth reason has to do with the 
fact that offer lists deal with a host country’s own 
regulations. Seen this way, precision becomes an 
imperative, as governments are keen to avoid situa-
tions where imprecise offers (and, thus, prospective 
commitments) sow the seeds of future trade dis-
putes and possible demands for compensation and/
or retaliatory measures. The informational deficits 
that developing country governments confront in 
the conduct of services negotiations aggravate this 
problem, reinforcing their tendency to considerable 
precaution in undertaking new or improved com-
mitments in services trade.
The above challenges notwithstanding, the past few 
years have witnessed a sea-change in the overall level 
of engagement by developing countries in services 
negotiations across a broad spectrum of sectors. 
Such a changing landscape attests to the growing 
realization that developing countries possess clear 
comparative advantages in the supply of many 
services, particularly those that make intensive use 
of labor.8 It also attests to the growing acceptance 
that negotiating offers can help secure enhanced 
access to imports (including imports of capital), 
particularly of key infrastructural services and the 
economy-wide benefits likely to derive from such 
access. As in the case of trade in goods, the main 
gains from trade in services—those most likely to 
enhance national welfare—relate to the possibility 
opened up by trade to import a broader array of 
cheaper or better products than those on offer do-
mestically and by exposing domestic suppliers in an 
orderly, adjustment-promoting, manner to greater 
competition as well as in attracting needed foreign 
investment in key sectors.
Services negotiations represent a unique opportunity 
for countries at all levels of development to secure 
better terms of access to foreign services markets, 
which reliance on unilateral reform efforts alone 
cannot provide. The preparatory work needed to 
formulate informed requests can also benefit from 
the regulatory inventories and capacity-building 
efforts described above. But there are additional mat-
ters that need to be addressed in order for a coun-
try, particularly a developing one, to put together 
development-enhancing requests.Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Some countries, particularly developing countries like China and 
9 
India, have shown a tendency to segment the conduct of their PTAs 
as between their goods and services components, typically focusing 
on the former first and dealing with services at a later stage.
Request lists are, by essence, offensive in character. 
They focus on sectors, sub-sectors and modes of 
supply against which requesting countries ask their 
partner countries to progressively remove or lessen 
access-impairing regulatory measures. The main 
motivation underlying request lists lies in the export 
interests of the requesting country’s leading service 
providers. The content of a country’s request list 
should therefore be based on an assessment of what 
these interests consist of—something that is still 
relatively absent from the approach that many devel-
oping countries take to the negotiations.
In principle, nothing prevents a country from ask-
ing for commitments in all sectors included under 
services agreements. The reason such an outcome 
normally does not arise in practice is that countries 
are often reluctant to formulate requests in areas 
where they may not be in a position to offer recipro-
cal concessions. This may explain the fact that a rela-
tively limited number of developing countries have 
chosen to take part in the collective requests that 
were formulated after the December 2005 WTO 
Hong Kong Ministerial.
Putting together targeted negotiating requests 
requires detailed information about the full range of 
measures preventing effective access to the markets 
of key trading partners. The breadth of services trade 
and the diversity of sectors renders information-
gathering a large and complex task, and one with 
which many developing countries, even larger ones, 
experience recurring difficulty. Such difficulties will 
be compounded if channels of communication with 
key stakeholders—i.e., chambers of commerce, ser-
vices firms already active in world markets or those 
in active prospecting mode, embassies in key foreign 
markets—are inadequate. This highlights the poten-
tial payoff from targeted efforts through TRTA at 
providing developing country suppliers with greater 
economic intelligence on market-access conditions 
and opportunities in export markets, access to distri-
bution channels, information on product standards, 
B2B dialogue and networking, etc.
The ultimate strategy to be followed in services 
negotiations and the accompanying position papers, 
offers, requests and other relevant documents 
that implement that strategy will also have to be 
informed by matters unrelated to services. Trade 
negotiations are typically organized as a “single 
undertaking,” where nothing is agreed until all is 
agreed. In other words, services negotiations are 
most often—if not always9—part of a bigger context 
which includes all sectors of a country’s economy. 
As the Doha negotiations have made abundantly 
clear, negotiations on agriculture and industrial 
products will necessarily exert a huge impact on 
the nature and pace of what is being negotiated in 
services—what is being demanded, what is being of-
fered, the overall approach to the negotiations and, 
possibly even the outstanding rules and principles 
that may be under negotiation. Thus, in addition 
to “self-contained” concerns relating to the service 
sector itself, a negotiating strategy for services must 
be informed by the limits and opportunities emerg-
ing from other elements of the Single Undertaking 
under negotiation. Once again, this draws attention 
to the need for adequate policy coordination among 
ministries and members of a country’s trade negoti-
ating team.
The range of pertinent concerns arising in the con-
duct of services negotiations is listed in Box A.7.
Implementing Negotiated 
Outcomes
The agreements emerging from the Uruguay Round 
brought a broad set of obligations for developing 
economies that went well beyond the traditional 
border measures of the old GATT, and into disci-
plines with a far wider development impact. This 
is plain to see in the services field with its cover-
age of sectors such as finance, telecommunications 
and transportation services whose economy-wide, 
infrastructural properties are of critical importance, 
as well as in sectors where a host of public policy 
concerns and sensitivities arise, such as health, edu-
cation, environmental, or audio-visual services.
While trade-related capacity building has in recent 
years increasingly contributed to bringing a num-
ber of developing economies to the point at which 
they are ready and able to formulate and negotiate 15
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a national trade strategy, this does not necessar-
ily imply that they are prepared to implement the 
resulting trade agreements. Nor does it guarantee 
the availability of resources required to handle the 
significant recurring costs that new trade rules in 
highly regulated sectors typically bring. Such costs 
may range from strengthening regulatory agencies to 
the establishment of independent regulatory agencies 
in the telecommunications or energy fields.
The administrative and financial burden of comply-
ing with WTO obligations will tend to be particu-
larly acute for WTO-acceding economies, especially 
the least developed economies, as accession is almost 
certain to involve far-reaching commitments to 
substantive legal and institutional reforms. More-
over, the cost of implementing WTO agreements or 
PTAs is not just associated with legal compliance. 
These costs also comprise the ancillary measures and 
costs to effectively obtain and support the benefits 
derived from implementation and liberalization. 
Such costs and capacity-building requirements will 
be diverse and varying according to the domestic 
circumstances, and in resource-constrained envi-
ronments may at times need to be assessed against 
competing, and at times more compelling, domestic 
priorities.
Addressing Regulatory Weaknesses
If there is one area where TRTA assistance can make 
a decisive contribution in the services field, it is in 
strengthening regulatory agencies and their staff in 
developing countries. Regulatory institutions are 
costly and require staff with sophisticated legal and 
economic skills. As the unfurling financial crisis in 
developed country markets is currently recalling, 
sound domestic regulation is critical to realizing the 
full benefits of open service markets and in mitigat-
ing or responding to its potential downsides.
To engage meaningfully in services negotiations, 
a country needs to feel confident in its ability to 
manage the regulatory, sectoral, and economy-wide 
implications of a liberalization. In assessing its 
competitive strengths and weaknesses in the produc-
tion and exchange of services, a country must openly 
confront any competitive weaknesses that directly 
result from its own regulatory regime. Onerous 
regulatory requirements may prevent a country’s 
enterprises in a particular sector from increasing 
the economic efficiency of their operations or from 
introducing new and more competitive services and 
marketing techniques.
Many service sectors are highly regulated as a con-
sequence of a range of policy objectives. Examples 
are consumer protection, equitable and/or univer-
sal access to services in the health and educational 
fields, environmental protection, and, in the case of 
financial services, the protection of depositors and 
the maintenance of a country’s financial stability. 
Such regulation forms an essential part both of good 
governance and a functioning market economy. Ac-
cordingly, both the GATS and preferential services 
agreements recognize the right of countries to regu-
late, and to introduce new regulations on the supply 
of services, to meet national policy objectives.
There are two main ways in which trade liberaliza-
tion in services can intersect with domestic regula-
tion. Firstly, in making regulations, governments 
need to take into account a wide range of factors, 
one of which may be the economy-wide, trade and 
investment impacts of such regulation. Information 
on the potential economic and trade/investment 
costs may assist governments in seeking the most 
efficient regulatory means of achieving desired policy 
objectives. There are likely to be positive effects in 
terms of overall democratic governance in the more 
efficient and transparent design, implementation, 
and enforcement of domestic regulations.
Secondly, the process of liberalizing services mar-
kets can require new or different types of regula-
tory intervention, for example to ensure that the 
expected benefits of liberalization are realized (e.g., 
that liberalization results in a genuinely competitive 
market) or that important policy objectives continue 
to be achieved within new market structures (e.g., 
universal service obligations).
Pro-competitive regulatory reform need not be 
necessarily an exercise in regulatory disarmament. It 
is precisely because service-sector liberalization more 
often than not requires significant new regulation 
that countries, particularly those with weak regulato-
ry capacities, may be loath to undertake far-reaching 
liberalization commitments in the context of trade 
agreements.Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Still, as the earlier discussion of the desirability of 
performing a trade-related regulatory audit suggested 
(see Box A.3), the process (and culture) of regula-
tory reform and review that trade negotiations may 
help to promote involves a number of key questions 
including, but not limited to:
the purpose or policy objective of the regula- •	
tion (e.g., consumer or environmental protec-
tion; prudential protection, ensuring competi-
tion or equitable and universal access to a ser-
vice, reducing income and regional disparities).
the effectiveness and efficiency of the regula- •	
tion (factors to consider may include whether 
the regulation is reasonable, objective in its 
application and transparent; whether it is pro-
portional to the objective being pursued; and 
whether it is linked to or rooted in international 
standards).
implementation of the regulation •	  (e.g., are 
there transparent and impartial procedures 
for implementing the regulation? Can natural 
and juridical persons affected by the regulation 
provide input prior to its adoption? Do natural 
and juridical persons negatively affected by the 
regulation have any recourse to appeal? Do the 
relevant ministries or government agencies have 
the requisite skills, financial resources and politi-
cal legitimacy to dispense their regulatory and 
implementation responsibilities?)
These points are merely indicative and certainly not 
exhaustive. Countries may not view all the points 
raised as being important, or may assign different 
degrees of importance to different factors. Consid-
eration and weighing of such factors, while essential 
for effective liberalization that serves national objec-
tives, including development or equity objectives, 
can be a challenging process, in particular for devel-
oping countries with limited administrative capacity. 
Many countries, indeed, require significant technical 
assistance in terms of regulatory capacity building, 
as well as training and assistance regarding the post 
market-opening implementation of commitments.
In engaging in services negotiations, governments 
need to have some idea of the desirable length of 
transition periods towards greater market openness. 
Liberalization cannot indeed be achieved or decreed 
overnight, particularly in services markets, but is 
typically best pursued in a progressive, orderly, and 
transparent manner. This allows, on the one hand, 
incumbents to prepare for greater competition and 
to anticipate and mitigate possible distributional 
downsides, and to put in place a proper regulatory 
framework on the other hand.
The complexity and slow pace of domestic regula-
tory reform efforts in many services markets im-
plies that countries will typically prefer to adopt 
a sequenced approach to market opening. Proper 
sequencing can help to overcome the concerns of 
domestic service providers over greater competi-
tive challenges. Recourse to progressive liberaliza-
tion may also buy needed time, allowing regulatory 
authorities to acquire the expertise required to 
properly regulate more open domestic markets and 
to anticipate and manage the new market risks such 
openness can entail.
There is little doubt that adopting and implement-
ing sounder regulation is key to better overall 
performance in services. Often, regulations trigger 
positive externalities in terms of facilitated trade 
and investment, improved investment climates, and 
the adoption of pro-competitive regulatory stances. 
This is why efforts directed at assisting developing 
countries to acquire and adopt best-practice regula-
tory regimes and to benchmark their regulatory 
regimes with prevailing international standards may 
be of considerable benefit to recipient countries in 
the services field.
In considering how best to serve the services-related 
aid-for-trade needs of developing countries, it ap-
pears desirable to distinguish countries by income 
level, which will typically offer a sound proxy of reg-
ulatory sophistication and absorptive capacity in ser-
vices. LDCs are likely to be better served by regional 
and multilateral development agencies with greater 
in-country presence, closer ongoing monitoring and 
a finer appreciation of the country- or region-specific 
types of institutional and human resource con-
straints that weigh on such countries. On the other 
hand, countries with more advanced regulatory/
implementation capacities are likely to have a keener 
interest in best-practice regulation, and in learning 
from—and comparing notes with—other emerging 
countries as well as developed country counterparts 
in areas of mutual regulatory interest.17
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The latter group comprises, for instance, the ITU (telecommunica-
10 
tions), the BIS (banking and insurance), the IOM (labor mobility), 
the WHO (trade and health), the ITC (private sector development, 
export promotion). 
Greater efforts need to be directed at providing op-
portunities for developing country officials to train 
in leading programs of trade and sectoral regulation 
in leading institutions of higher education as well as 
in relevant international organizations with particu-
lar sectoral expertise.10
Other options include capacity-building activities 
that embed longer-term donor country expertise 
within regulatory agencies in recipient countries, 
as well as pairing local institutions with leading 
universities or policy research institutions. Examples 
for such training and regulatory strengthening are 
the China-EU Trade Project and the USAID-funded 
International Trade Assistance Project in Indonesia, 
depicted in Box A.8 below. Trade and investment 
liberalization is hardly without distributional conse-
quences. The gains and losses arising from a change 
in domestic conditions of competition affect differ-
ent groups in society, and a careful assessment needs 
to take account of the impact of liberalization on 
vulnerable groups (including workers in state-owned 
enterprises likely to face greater post-liberalization 
dislocation), as well as the interest of poor, small 
and geographically remote firms, all of which can 
confront more limited access to finance.
A further candidate for enhanced assistance in the 
implementation phase thus is the design of reforms 
that properly factor in the distributional impacts of 
liberalization on various parts of the population (ru-
ral vs. urban, formal vs. informal, men vs. women, 
children), and to improve their access to essential 
services. Such services run the gamut from sanita-
tion to transport, telecommunications, small-scale 
finance, education and health. While most of these 
complementary policy challenges lie outside the 
realm of trade negotiations, getting them right can 
help to build needed support for market opening 
efforts. However, implementing such policies in an 
economically sound manner can present numerous 
challenges to weak bureaucracies, and many develop-
ing countries will require outside support and a fair 
amount of time in meeting them.
Much TRTA delivery, including in services trade, 
takes the form of short training activities delivered 
in-country. Effective course design and delivery, and 
above all attention to context specificity, are critical 
ingredients of such assistance. Box A.9 below high-
lights a number of best practices in TRTA design 
and delivery drawn from Australia’s recent experi-
ence in Indonesia.
Box A.10 contains a number of questions that 
emerge in regard to the implementation phase of the 
trade-negotiation cycle in services trade.19
5 Enhancing the Capacity to Supply
This means that small service providers cannot easily compete on 
11 
reputational grounds, and must thus rely heavily on business prospec-
tive efforts in target markets to make themselves known. The latter 
trend highlights the strong interest expressed by developing countries 
against restrictions on the temporary entry of business visitors. 
For many small firms, equity finance is not a viable option. Most 
12 
Service sector SMEs thus rely primarily on debt finance for purposes 
of running and expanding their businesses. There is much anecdotal 
evidence that banks are less likely to lend to service-producing firms 
relative to manufacturing enterprises. To some extent, this may be 
due to the intangible nature of service-sector output and the lesser 
value of physical assets that can serve as collateral. 
See OECD (2003) and Chaitoo (2008). 
13 
The last pillar of a coherent negotiating package in 
services needs to target the very real constraints that 
many developing country exporters face in attempting 
to supply newly opened markets. Despite the growing 
number of success stories in sectors such as energy, 
business-process outsourcing, construction or envi-
ronmental services, there remain too few documented 
examples of companies from developing countries 
involved in export trade to a significant degree.
Several reasons may be adduced to explain this 
fact, starting with the fact that most services firms, 
including in OECD countries, are very small. Small 
service suppliers typically have limited human re-
sources to build referral networks, find local partners 
abroad, identify market opportunities, and research 
regulatory conditions prevailing in foreign markets. 
In many market segments, such as telecommunica-
tions, utilities, finance and transportation, develop-
ing country firms also need to contend with the 
large fixed costs of entering capital-intensive sectors, 
as well as with the presence of very large companies 
in the market. Even in sectors where developing 
countries are exporting, studies reveal a number of 
key common problems facing their exporters. These 
include: (i) market-development constraints flow-
ing from low brand recognition and difficulties in 
establishing credibility with international suppliers;11 
(ii) lack of access to financing for export or business 
development;12 (iii) limited prospects to serve for-
eign markets via an established presence (i.e., more 
limited returns on Mode 3 commitments by trading 
partners); (iv) lack of access to reliable and inexpen-
sive infrastructure and key input services, notably 
finance and telecommunications/IT; and (v) lack of 
access to a range of formal and informal networks 
and institutional facilities necessary for trade.13
Developing economies typically need to diversify 
and add value to their production chains and export 
baskets. This requires, first and foremost, enhanced 
access to foreign markets and a progressive lifting of 
impediments to trade, investment and labor move-
ment facing service suppliers—the essence of what 
trade negotiations can deliver. Yet securing durable 
gains in supply capacity requires efforts on several 
other fronts. Chief among these are: to raise quality 
standards; meet host-country certification require-
ments; and improve home-country trade infrastruc-
ture, notably through higher quality and lower cost 
of communications, finance, transportation and 
logistics services.
Governments, the private sector and development 
partners have to invent new ways of working to-
gether to foster competitive supply responses. This is 
arguably the hardest element of the services-negoti-
ating cycle, because matters relating to private-sector 
development tend to involve forms of expertise 
and institutions that are not centrally involved in 
earlier moments of the negotiating life-cycle. Still, 
experience shows that important trade performance 
payoffs can result from targeting development assis-Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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A recent inventory of completed and ongoing technical support 
14 
initiatives for the CARIFORUM region conducted by the European 
Commission (EC) found that of about 200 TRTA projects or multi-
year programs, only three specifically targeted services. See Chaitoo 
(2008), p. 308.
tance towards intermediary (so-called “meso-level”) 
institutions and processes, such as private sector 
associations, SME support structures and public-
private dialogue and partnering activities.
As to be noted below the aid-for-trade debate has to 
date largely centered on support to the public rather 
than the private sector. Aid-for-trade financing has 
also shown a distinct bias towards activities other 
than services.14 While one should not discount the 
very real difficulties that public-sector entities face 
in preparing for, conducting and implementing the 
outcome of trade negotiations, there is little deny-
ing that real commercial capacity constraints also 
lie in the private sector. Such constraints can all but 
obviate the ability of countries and firms to take 
advantage of newly-opened trade and investment 
opportunities.
The primary focus of assistance efforts on public-sec-
tor entities can be traced to the nature and mandates 
of regional and multilateral dispensers of TRTA, 
which are primarily designed to serve the interests of 
national governments or regional regulatory or nego-
tiating entities. Such a bias, however, also traces its or-
igin in a dearth of knowledge and policy instruments 
designed specifically to help developing country firms 
expand their services trade. Redressing the existing 
bias in services-related TRTA design and delivery is 
critical to lifting the constraints weighing on services 
exporting firms from developing countries.
While governments at all levels of development 
face numerous challenges in understanding how to 
maximize the benefits to their economies—and for 
their service suppliers—from engaging more fully 
in services trade negotiations, such challenges are 
clearly more acute for developing countries. There 
are several reasons for this. First, governments often 
have incomplete information about the current sta-
tus of services trade activities in their own country. 
Most export-development initiatives have focused on 
goods trade, and so service exporters have become 
used to operating independently of government 
programs. Government officials therefore typically 
have only anecdotal data on services export activities.
This fact is reinforced by the historically incomplete 
services-trade statistics, in part because there is not 
a convenient check point (such as a border crossing) 
at which trade data can be collected for the major-
ity of services. Most WTO Members not only lack 
information about what services are being exported 
to which markets, but also lack a registry of service 
exporters to query.
Second, a related issue is that most governments do 
not collect detailed statistics on services that firms 
or households purchase and so do not have usefully 
disaggregated data on services inputs into national 
economic sectors. This hinders efforts at measuring 
the impact on the domestic economy of either liber-
alizing or restricting access to foreign services.
Third, in most countries, including developed 
economies, up to 95 percent of service firms are 
small or very small and so are often under-represent-
ed in statistical surveys due to the response burdens 
such surveys represent. In addition, very small firms 
typically do not have staff dedicated to government 
relations and so do not participate actively in gov-
ernment trade consultations.
Fourth, services trade agreements remain relatively 
new and, as yet, have tended to offer relatively few 
actual liberalization benefits, other than transparency, 
in key foreign markets. Thus, neither service export-
ers nor service importers have been highly motivated 
to participate in government consultations.
Finally, advocacy groups such as industry associa-
tions are still largely unaware of their smaller mem-
bers’ service export activities and so are not always 
able to represent their interests. In many countries, 
services industry associations are relatively less de-
veloped than their counterparts in manufacturing or 
agriculture.
In order to negotiate effectively and to better identify 
the interests, competitive strengths and weaknesses 
of domestic suppliers, and to direct policy attention 
to stronger supply capacities, governments should 
consider a number of objectives in consultation with 
domestic stakeholders, as noted in Box A.11.21
Enhancing the Capacity to Supply 
Of particular importance in the services field is the 
need for the private sector to acquire a voice in the 
trade-negotiating process and to speak to the needs 
of both users and providers of services. Assisting in 
the creation, early funding and nurturing of sustain-
able coalitions of service industries in developing 
countries represents a novel form of trade-related 
technical assistance in services trade, involving direct 
business to business dialogue supported by donor 
governments (see Box A.12 below).
As noted above, because of its central focus on the 
private sector, capacity building in respect of supply-
side constraints involves a different set of institu-
tional actors than those concerned with the strength-
ening of trade negotiating or regulatory capacity. 
Such differences matter for assistance design and 
inter-agency coordination efforts. It is, here again, an 
area where greater private-sector involvement from 
service-exporting firms in industrial countries could 
usefully complement the efforts of bilateral donors 
and multilateral agencies such as the ITC or the 
World Bank. 
Service-exporting firms in industrial countries also 
have a stake in ensuring that developing country 
markets are progressively opened, that such opening 
is sustainable, and that it occurs in a stable regula-
tory environment. These objectives can be served 
by enhanced private-sector support for improved 
regulatory institutions and practices in develop-
ing countries. Means thus need to be devised for 
the private sector to contribute financial resources, 
people, and expertise towards efforts at enhanced 
regulatory performance and improved compliance 
with quality and licensing standards and their im-
provement as well as greater access to distribution 
networks. 
Strong potential payoffs may also be expected to flow 
from targeted efforts through TRTA at providing 
developing country suppliers with greater economic 
intelligence on market access conditions and op-
portunities in export markets, access to distribution 
channels, information on product standards, business 
to business (B2B) dialogue and networking, etc.
The need for simplification of information on 
domestic regulatory procedures (including licensing 
and product certification) and the lack of market 
intelligence rank among the biggest commercial 
barriers to increased service exports in developing 
countries. There is a need to implement mechanisms 
in developed and leading emerging countries that 
go beyond passive enquiry/contact points in help-
ing predominantly small service-supplying firms 
to better contest markets in rich countries. OECD 
and leading emerging economies need to provide 
real commercial meaning to the commitments made 
under GATS Article IV (Increasing Participation of 
Developing Countries) and its PTA equivalents by 
offering tangible market-access support to develop-
ing country suppliers. Meeting such challenges can 
be facilitated through the work of dedicated agencies 
such as the Trade Facilitation Office of Canada (see 
Box A.13 below) or the Centre for the Promotion 
of Imports from developing countries (CBI) in The 
Netherlands.
There is, as well, an obvious role for coalitions of 
service industries in various OECD and emerging 
countries to play in helping set up B2B contacts, es-
pecially among SMEs. Moreover, funding assistance 
from government sources for private sector develop-
ment purposes could prove particularly helpful. 
The multiplicity of modes of supplying services and 
the ensuing regulatory intensity of services trade 
and of related factor movements raises a host of 
further technical assistance challenges in buttressing 
supply capacities. The predominance of com-
mercial presence as a mode of supplying services 
suggests that assistance directed at enhancing a host 
country’s investment climate may be particularly 
important in strengthening the competitiveness 
of the service sector and in eliciting an adequate 
private-sector response in the form of new FDI. 
Beyond supplying needed (and scarce) capital, 
FDI inflows in both (goods and services) can be 
expected to provide expanded opportunities for 
local suppliers of a host of services (e.g., telecoms, 
transport, logistics, finance, professional and busi-
ness services) and potentially enhance access to the 
distribution channels of multinational enterprises 
in other markets. Particular attention should be 
devoted to assistance targeted at developing an FDI 
promotion tool kit specifically for service industries 
and offering best-practice advice on the design and 
implementation of investment incentive schemes in 
various service industries.Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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At the same time, the rising salience of cross-border 
trade and of possibilities for remotely supply-
ing service markets highlights the need for greater 
regulatory convergence through the development 
and adoption of international standards and the 
negotiation of mutual recognition agreements as 
means of facilitating increased cross-border trade 
in services. Low standards and related inadequacies 
in domestic regulation can frustrate the access of 
developing country services and service providers 
to foreign markets. Helping developing countries 
improve domestic standards and qualifications for 
services, notably by strengthening their participation 
in regional or global standard-setting initiatives, is 
another area where more focused capacity-building 
efforts can be expected to yield strong development 
dividends. Questions that arise in the provision of 
assistance directed at strengthening the supply-side 
capacity of developing country exporters of services 
include those noted in Box A.14.23
6
The Challenge of  
Aid-for-Trade in Services
CARIFORUM membership comprises the Member States of the 
15 
Caricom, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. 
Market opening in the service sector needs to be ac-
companied by a careful combination of competition 
and regulation. Such a process can present substan-
tial challenges to resource-constrained governments 
in many developing countries, particularly the least 
developed countries (LDCs and small and vulnerable 
economies (SVEs)). Other aspects of successful ser-
vice sector reforms include progressive liberalization, 
which is a feature that trade agreements are generally 
well designed to promote, as well as trade-related ca-
pacity building, comprising investments in sounder 
negotiating and regulatory regimes and institutions 
(a goal that is today fully acknowledged in the Doha 
Development Agenda and other negotiation fora).
Combining aid for trade with additional trade and 
investment liberalization commitments could help 
to advance services negotiations, while also address-
ing the concerns voiced by many developing country 
governments and civil society organizations over 
the extent of asymmetries at the negotiating table. 
Because of the diversity of different service sectors, 
any coherence-promoting aid-for-trade package in 
services requires close cooperation and coordination 
among multilateral institutions, bilateral donors, and 
civil society actors (both private sector and NGO 
representatives).
The DDA and Ministerial declarations linked to 
PTAs make recurring references to trade-related 
technical assistance and capacity building. Absent 
greater efforts to give operational meaning to those 
terms, the risk may arise that the absence, inad-
equate supply or inappropriateness of such assistance 
may frustrate, unduly hold back, or even provide a 
ready-made excuse to renounce needed reforms and 
attendant liberalization commitments. To mitigate 
such a risk, more formal linkages are necessary be-
tween enhanced engagement in services negotiations 
by developing countries and additional assistance on 
the part of developed countries and relevant multi-
lateral agencies.
Such a link could lend greater credibility to both 
liberalization and technical assistance programs. 
Indeed, the development promise of the Doha 
Round and the ubiquitous calls for coherence in 
policy-making would be well served if future trade 
agreements entailed a tangible set of provisions and 
up-front commitments by the leading multilateral 
and regional lending agencies and bilateral donors 
to strengthen regulatory institutions. As indicated in 
Box A.15, such a linkage has begun to take root at 
the PTA level, with the recent Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) entered into between the member 
states of the European Union (EU) and those of the 
CARIFORUM.15 The EPA offers a first attempt 
at crafting operational aid-for-trade provisions 
in services trade and embedding them in a trade 
agreement. Time will tell whether, how, and to what 
extent such a novel precedent can be replicated in 
other PTAs as well as at the multilateral level.
The Need for a Tailored Response
The particular nature of services trade and liber-
alization involves a number of special features to 
the aid-for-trade debate. The non-tariff nature of 
impediments to services trade implies that govern-
ments do not forego fiscal receipts when engaging in 
services liberalization. Absent tariff protection, there Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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An exception is countries seeking accession to the WTO. For a 
16 
fuller discussion of the level of GATS commitments by newly-acced-
ing WTO Members, see Roy et al. (2007).
For a fuller discussion of emergency safeguard measures in services 
17 
trade, see Sauvé (2002). 
is no significant preference-erosion agenda to speak 
of in services trade, and hence little need for com-
pensatory payments for countries or regions affected 
by MFN-based negotiations.
Moreover, the practice of market opening in services, 
where status quo commitments are far more likely 
rather than significant de novo market opening, sug-
gests that far-reaching post-liberalization adjustment 
pressures are generally weaker (or minimal) in most 
negotiating settings. This implies that discussions 
of an aid-for-trade response in services can gener-
ally be divorced from concerns over the design and 
adequacy of compensatory financing for those that 
may be adversely affected by market opening, which 
is a key issue in goods negotiations. But this is not to 
say that market opening in services cannot produce 
distributional downsides. It most surely can, as with 
liberalization in any given sector. The main point, 
however, is that significant new market opening 
is rarely the norm at the negotiating table. 16 Any 
opening should, moreover, be properly sequenced, 
including pre-commitments to future liberalization 
via GATS Article XVIII (Additional Commitments), 
in order to mitigate significant adjustment pressures 
and to ensure that market opening and regulatory 
strengthening are carried out concomitantly.
Adjustment pressures resulting from market-opening 
initiatives in services could further be addressed 
through recourse to an operational emergency-
safeguard mechanism. This is an area of unfinished 
rule-making where progress remains desirable, but 
where ongoing discussions have tended to bog down 
over repeated—and ultimately futile—attempts at 
replicating GATT practices in a services setting.17
Devising an Aid for  
Trade Agenda in Services
Without the need to respond to concerns over pref-
erence erosion and significant post-negotiation dislo-
cation pressures, the question arises where additional 
assistance is most needed for services. As Mattoo 
(2006) has aptly noted, developing countries face 
two central challenges in undertaking service sector 
reforms. The first is identifying the elements of eco-
nomically sound policies, and a second to assess how 
the policies at the domestic level can be supported 
by multilateral (or bilateral/regional) negotiations.
To address the deficit in negotiating, enforcement, 
implementation, and supply-side capacities that the 
majority of developing countries face in services 
negotiations, it is necessary to take a fresh look at the 
idea of embedding an aid-for-trade component in 
services trade agreements. Such a component should 
target each of the key moments of the negotiating 
cycle in services described earlier.25
Conclusions 7
This paper has been designed to provide a practical 
guide to the planning, implementing, and evalua-
tion of a program of services that may be particularly 
useful for emerging market and developing econo-
mies. It is evident that a great deal of care is needed 
in carrying out a program of services negotiations. 
The checklists and illustrative examples that have 
been provided will hopefully give policy makers the 
background and advice that can result in an effective 
and successful negotiating outcome for their services 
sectors.27
Appendix
Box A.1. The Place of Services in National Development Strategies
What is the institutional setting for dealing with services within the government? •	
Is there an authority, agency, or ministry responsible for coordinating strategies focused on the service sector? •	
Is the coordinating authority, agency, or ministry capable of making and executing decisions? •	
Are services being dealt with adequately from a sectoral perspective? Are there sufficient and well-functioning ministries or agencies devoted to  •	
service sectors?
Are services an integral part of the decision-making process in the establishment of national development strategies? •	
Are national development strategies based on economy-wide considerations? •	
Are the priorities established for the service sector (including the role assigned to trade and investment policy) based on economy-wide  •	
considerations in addition to sector-specific concerns?
Have distinctions been made regarding horizontal  •	 versus sectoral priorities for services?
Are priorities clear in terms of support, regulation, or policy-making for services and their relationship to the overall economy? •	
Do specific national policy objectives for services clash with broader objectives for national development? •	
How far should government intervention go in the economic realm in general and in the service sector in particular? •	
Is the service sector sufficiently internationalized? How internationalized should it be according to national development objectives? What role  •	
should be assigned to trade and investment policy relative to autonomous liberalization in this regard?
Has a cost-and-benefit analysis been undertaken with respect to the opening up of the economy in general and the service economy in  •	
particular?
Has a cost-and-benefit analysis been undertaken with respect to the non-liberalization of the economy? How clear are the government and key  •	
stakeholders on the opportunity costs of various liberalization scenarios?Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Box A.2. Policy-making Benefits from Effective Intra-governmental Coordination
Given the regulatory intensity of many service activities and the range of sectors involved, proper co-ordination across various government 
agencies is critical. Promoting an effective process of intra-governmental coordination is likely to generate a number of positive policy-making 
externalities. These include the following:
To create a whole range of government positions
Services negotiations are highly information intensive. Co-ordination is essential to develop negotiating positions based on a complete assessment 
of key national priorities, and to ensure that negotiators are well informed of the full range of factors influencing the domestic services market. 
In countries with federal systems of governance, such co-ordination can be important in ensuring that federal government negotiators are well 
equipped, in terms of both knowledge and mandate, to address trading partners’ questions on sub-national measures.
To create an information base on measures affecting trade in services
One of the key substantive obligations flowing from most trade agreements covering services is to provide trading partners with accurate information 
on the domestic regulatory environment affecting trade in services. Meeting such transparency obligations can be assisted by the creation of a central 
inventory, or focal point (and, preferably, a database), of the various regulatory measures, and a means for keeping that inventory up to date.
To identify and analyze the effects of specific measures on the achievement of economic or social policy objectives
Governments at all levels need periodically to review the effectiveness of existing domestic policies and regulations in achieving underlying 
economic and social policy objectives. This may include an analysis of the trade or investment effects of regulatory measures.
There is a need to create an awareness of the impact of services trade disciplines on regulatory conduct in sectors where commitments are sched-
uled, including in respect of notification requirements
In developing new policy initiatives, all parts of government need to be sensitized to the need to take into account current services-trade commit-
ments, consider incorporating international standards where applicable, and meet notification requirements and disciplines on regulatory conduct.
To avoid duplication in domestic stakeholder and intra-governmental consultations
Especially among small and very small service firms, it is important to avoid unnecessary surveying in order to retain their co-operation. If a 
particular government entity needs to consult with firms under its direct mandate, that consultation should be coordinated with the trade ministry 
to include any services-related issues instead of re-surveying the firms specifically about trade in services.
Given the multitude of sub-sectors and measures arising from services trade, it is important to find a balance between engaging intra-governmen-
tal partners on issues of mutual concerns and avoiding inundating key departments and agencies with too much information or requests for input. 
The establishment of good regular lines of communication between individuals can play a significant role in quickly addressing issues without 
creating unnecessary process.
To contribute to an ongoing assessment of the impact of services-trade liberalization
In most countries, data for impact analysis are the responsibility of the national statistical agency. However, such a task is challenging for several 
reasons and recourse to anecdotal information can be useful. First, services trade agreements address the issue of the flow of services, while data 
collection is typically focused on populations of service industries. Second, services trade agreements cover four modes of supplying services, while 
data collection is typically focused on cross-border trade (Modes 1 and 4), a limited portion of in-country trade such as tourism or education 
services (Mode 2), and very little of foreign affiliate trade (Mode 3). Third, a particular service may also be exported by goods manufacturers and 
firms in related service industries; simply surveying one particular service industry may therefore not always give a complete picture of export 
activity. Goods-trade statistics include services that are exported by manufacturers, including both services bundled with goods (e.g., maintenance 
or training agreements) and stand-alone services sold by manufacturers to foreigners (e.g., financial services, consulting services). “Bundled” 
services sold to foreigners need to be distinguished from domestic service transactions that are embedded in exported goods and so are not service 
exports. It is helpful to alert the various parts of government that participate in data collection to the relevant issues for assessment and the 
consequent data requirements.
Source: OECD (2002).(continued on next page)
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Appendix
In the Canadian context, with which one of this reportís co-authors was directly involved, compilation of the list of non-conforming measures 
18 
maintained at the federal level was carried out over a four-month period by a small team of young officials chosen for their expertise in law under 
the supervision of a member of the services negotiating team who provided them with a methodology to produce comparable reservations across 
Box A.3. Performing a Trade-related Regulatory Audit in Services
The two-way interaction afforded by the request-offer process on which services negotiations typically rest can be very useful if it can underpin 
attempts to benchmark a country’s domestic services regulation with that of its main trading partners and if it can identify means of achieving 
greater policy convergence and/or moves in the direction of “best” (often pro-competitive) regulatory practices. Such benchmarking, and the 
related need (in response to potential requests from trading partners) to identify more precisely what policies and measures can (and cannot) be 
addressed in the negotiations, may also allow a useful policy dialogue to take place between trade officials, sectoral regulators and officials in 
other government agencies and departments, as well as with key stakeholders in business and civil society. Such two-way policy interaction is also 
a potentially important means of answering the central question of what policy objectives developing countries ultimately wish to pursue in their 
GATS/PTA negotiations, both domestically and in foreign markets. Questions that may arise in such a domestic   so as to inform the request-offer 
process comprise the following:
What is the policy objective pursued by the relevant regulatory measure? •	
 Is the policy objective pursued by the specific measure still consistent with overall government policy? •	
How transparent is the regulatory measure and the process to adopt it? •	
Are private sector stakeholders, domestic and foreign, consulted prior to the enactment of new policy measures? •	
When was the policy measure, law or regulation enacted? •	
When was the measure last invoked? •	
Is it periodically reviewed? •	
Is the government satisfied that the policy objective is being achieved and has it developed a framework to assess the effectiveness of its  •	
regulatory regime?
Can the policy measure be achieved through other means or in a manner that might lessen its restrictive impact on trade or investment? •	
Performing an audit of a country’s regulatory regime in the context of negotiations on services trade and investment liberalization may thus  •	
generate positive policy spillovers in terms of domestic regulatory conduct and design and contribute to a strengthening of consultations within 
and outside government in the services field. Among the reasons why governments might be interested in engaging a trade-related regulatory 
audit are the following:
Ensuring that key regulatory objectives are met in the most efficient manner (i.e., in the manner that is least wasteful of scarce public  •	
resources), including in respect of prudential, consumer protection or social policy objectives.
Identifying antiquated or inefficient regulations and adopting or converging towards international best practices. In the field of financial ser- •	
vices, for instance, this may allow a benchmarking of the degree to which domestic prudential standards and regulations approximate agreed 
international norms such as those found at the BIS, IOSCO and the IAIS.
Encouraging, where feasible, the adoption of market access-friendly (pro-competitive) regulation. •	
Building trust within the government (i.e., encouraging a “whole of government” approach to domestic regulation) through closer dialogue  •	
between trade negotiators, ministries and sectoral regulators.
Deepening dialogue with key external stakeholders, including regional/local governments, producers and users/consumers, NGOs, and the aca- •	
demic community. Gaining a clearer sense of the reasons behind the possible continued need to maintain potentially trade- and investment-
restrictive measures.
As regards the practical means of effecting such an audit,18 one useful starting point is to prepare a list of non-conforming measures, i.e., the 
equivalent of a negative list of measures, which absent their inscription in reservation lists, would be found in breach of the key liberalizing 
provisions found in trade agreements—national treatment, market access (quantitative restrictions), local presence requirements, and most Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
30
favored nation (MFN) treatment—and to describe comprehensively: (i) the sectoral nature of the listed non-conforming measures (for definitional 
purposes); (ii) the level of government at which they are applied (i.e., national, sub-national or municipal); (iii) their legal anchoring (i.e., the 
full citation of the law or regulation in question); and (iv) the precise nature of their non-conformity.
Recourse to such an audit was pioneered in the context of preparing the negative lists of non-conforming measures defining the Parties’ legally 
binding commitments under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 19 There are several uses to which a trade-related regulatory 
audit may be put. These include:
Providing a comprehensive overview of the trade- and investment-restrictive components of a country’s regulatory regime. •	
Identifying regulations in need of reform and possibly elimination (which can then yield useful negotiating currency). •	
Confirming the legitimacy and continued need for trade- and/or investment-restrictive regulations. •	
Being clearer on the implicit hierarchy of trade- and investment restrictive measures (e.g., understanding which type of restrictive measure is  •	
most likely to be deemed market-access unfriendly by trading partners). This may include non-discriminatory measures, particularly quantita-
tive restrictions (i.e., market-access measures), including prudential measures.
Identifying measures that may be scheduled in trade agreements (i.e., in making new and/or improved negotiating offers). •	
Anticipating partner country negotiating requests and assessing the scope for opening up/reforming regulations or leaving them unchanged. •	
It bears noting that the negative list-based regulatory audit depicted above focuses policy attention on measures that are either overtly discrimi-
natory (in the case of measures violating the national treatment and MFN provisions of trade agreements) or which overtly constrain the quantum 
of market competition allowed (in the case of market access or non-discriminatory quantitative restrictions).
A trade-related regulatory audit conducted along these lines may therefore not always easily provide a full reading of all non-discriminatory mea-
sures that may nonetheless be unduly burdensome or act as disguised restrictions to trade and investment and for which trade disciplines are being 
sought under the GATS Article VI:4 work program. Identifying such measures is inherently more difficult and requires considerably more dialogue be-
tween trade negotiators, ministries, and sectoral regulators and greater technical competence on the part of trade ministries than is often available.
Despite the above caveats, experience shows that a trade-related regulatory audit that maps the universe of explicitly restrictive governmental 
measures affecting trade and investment in services can still yield important gains in transparency and help anticipate negotiating red lines and 
implementation bottlenecks. In turn, the homework and regulatory dialogue that flow from such an exercise can help to promote a culture of pro-
competitive regulatory reform in countries that attempt it. Conducting an audit is indeed a useful means of preparing for services negotiations, to 
master the sectoral intricacies and the technical details that are the very currency of services negotiations conducted along request-offer lines, give 
service providers a one-stop inventory of restrictive measures maintained at home (and in the markets of key trading partners to the extent that 
such efforts are reciprocated or mandated by trade agreements), and afford negotiators a complete road map of measures to target and rank order 
in future negotiations. None of the above is readily possible without precise information on the regulatory status quo.
Source: Sauvé (2008).
Box A.3. Performing a Trade-related Regulatory Audit in Services (continued)
all service sectors. Once the inventory was completed in draft form, the Canadian trade negotiating team was able to sit down with ministries 
and sectoral regulatory agencies, asking the latter to verify the accuracy of the information collated in the first instance and engaging in a second 
phase in a policy dialogue on the rationale behind restrictive measures, the possibility (or not) to achieve such objectives through other means 
(including via non-discriminatory measures) and the scope for removing (or not) such non-conforming measures or progressively reducing the 
level of their non-conformity in the context of the NAFTA negotiations. Such a dialogue was also carried out with private sector representatives, 
asking similar questions on the scope for modifying or eliminating existing restrictive measures maintained at the domestic level. 
Such a listing of non-conforming measures is typically found in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) modeled on the NAFTA that pursue a 
19 
negative list approach to liberalization. A number of more recent PTAs, notably those negotiated by Japan, have sought to embed such negative 
lists solely for transparency purposes, with the respective Partiesí legally binding commitments on services governed on the basis of the ìhybridî 
scheduling approach found in GATS (which combines the voluntary, positive, selection of sectors, sub-sectors and modes of supply in which 
commitments are scheduled with the negative listing of limitations to national treatment and market access maintained in scheduled sectors, 
sub-sectors and modes of supply). Unlike the GATS, where Parties are free to determine the level of their positive bindings, the Japanese PTAs 
feature an obligation whereby positively listed commitments lock in the regulatory status quo. As noted in Box A.1, such an approach was repli-
cated, most recently, in the EPA entered into by the EU member states and the CARIFORUM.31
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Box A.4. A Trade-related Regulatory Audit: Illustrative Examples
1. Singapore-US Free Trade Agreement: Singapore’s Schedule
Sector: Financial services
Sub-Sector: Banking services
Industry Classification: —
Type of Reservation: Market access and national treatment
Level of Government: National
Measures: Banking Act, Cap. 19; MAS Notice 619
Description: Only a maximum of 20 new Wholesale Bank licenses will be granted by the Monetary Authority of Singapore between 30 June 
2001 and 30 June 2003. Quantitative limits on the number of Wholesale Bank licenses will be removed for U.S. banks 3 years after the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement. Wholesale banks are not permitted to: (a) accept Singapore dollar fixed deposits of less than S$250,000; 
(b) offer savings accounts; (c) operate interest-bearing Singapore dollar current accounts for natural persons who are Singapore residents; 
(d) issue Singapore dollar bonds and negotiable certificates of deposit, unless requirements pertaining to minimum maturity period, minimum 
denomination or class of investors contained in the Guidelines for Operation of Wholesale Banks issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
are complied with.
2. Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement: Japan’s schedule
Sector: Financial services
Sub-Sector: Banking services
Industry Classification: JSIC 612 (banks, except Central Bank); 621 (financial institutions for small businesses)
Type of Reservation: Market access and National treatment
Level of Government: Central government
Measures: Deposit insurance law (Law No 34 of 1971), Article 2
Description: The deposit insurance system only covers financial institutions that have their head offices within the jurisdiction of Japan.
3. North American Free Trade Agreement: Mexico’s Reservation List (Annex I)
Sector: Communications
Sub-Sector: Entertainment Services (Cinema)
Industry Classification: CMAP 941103-Private Exhibition of Films
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Article 1202); Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Level of Government: Federal
Measures: Ley de la Industria Cinematográfica; Reglamento de la Ley de la Industria Cinematográfica
Description: Thirty percent of the screen time of every theater, assessed on an annual basis, may be reserved for films produced by Mexican 
persons either within or outside the territory of Mexico.Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Box A.5. Key Questions in the Preparatory Phase of Services Negotiations
Is there a national or sectoral development strategy for services that should be informing the preparatory work for negotiations? •	
Has thought been given to the place of reform in the development of the domestic service market and the relationship of that reform to  •	
international trade negotiations at hand?
Is the coordinating authority, agency, or ministry fully in place and ready to operate? •	
Have capacity-building needs been identified with respect to the overall approach to liberalization and trade agreements—i.e., the readiness  •	
to liberalize, the strategies to adopt in negotiating liberalization and the advantages from negotiating, particularly in terms of access to foreign 
markets?
Are other external priorities in related international fora clear to all participants in the preparatory process—for example, positions and com- •	
mitments taken in the context of bilateral agreements?;
Is there a reasonable understanding amongst those participating and, in particular, by the coordinating entity, as to what are measures affect- •	
ing trade in services as per international trade agreements?
Do those coordinating the work need further capacity building in matters relating to international trade agreements? •	
In the case of sectoral ministries and agencies, how should the capacity-building exercise be best pursued? •	
Does an inventory of measures affecting trade in services already exist at the horizontal and/or sectoral level? Beyond its use in trade negotia- •	
tions, is the information gathered in such inventories being used to underpin domestic dialogue with key regulatory agencies and external 
stakeholders and as a means to promote regulatory review and reform processes?
Once an inventory of regulatory measures is put in place, what is the basis for determining what regulatory requirements are adequate and/or  •	
acceptable or in need of change?
In instances where regulatory change appears necessary, can or should changes be contemplated within the timeframe of ongoing interna- •	
tional negotiations?
If so, could or should these changes be presented as part of the offer the country is to make in these negotiations? •	
In the case of all measures, what is the criterion to be applied in choosing which measures and/or modes of supply in which sectors should be  •	
offered as bound, partially bound or unbound in the negotiations?
Has a clear distinction been established between defensive and offensive interests in the negotiations? How does the government establish its  •	
negotiating “red lines,” i.e., points beyond which it is not prepared to engage or commit?
Are offensive interests actually able to take advantage of the negotiations, or is there need for additional capacity-building, in particular for  •	
private-sector supply?
Have export-market studies been conducted within government or by the private sector? •	
Has all relevant information (public, private, international, etc.) regarding export interests been compiled, analyzed and circulated amongst  •	
participants in the preparatory group?
How significant is the voice of consumer/user groups in the formulation of service sector policy? Should technical assistance be directed at  •	
nurturing such voices or sustaining their development?
Has the coordinating entity managed to organize the necessary consulting process with all relevant stakeholders in the public and private  •	
sectors, including with trade unions and with relevant non-governmental organizations?
Is the consultation process with stakeholders broad enough to be truly representative? •	
Does the decision-making process seek to achieve a proper balance between sectoral, individual corporate, and economy-wide objectives (both  •	
offensive and defensive)?33
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It bears recalling that the bulk of the Uruguay Round was spent on developing the framework of disciplines and rules for services trade. Con-
20 
siderably less time was spent on the market-access dimension of the talks, and no specific attention was paid to the idea of alternative methods of 
conducting market-access negotiations in services.
Box A.6. The Doha Round Shift Towards Collective Requests
For lack of any credible alternative,20 and drawing on mercantilistic reflexes long honed in goods (i.e., tariff) negotiations, the bilateral request-
offer approach was adopted in the Uruguay Round as the dominant negotiating method for opening up services markets.
Concern over the limited progress, time-consuming nature, and information-intensive asymmetries implicit in such an approach led to a decision 
by Trade Ministers at the December 2005 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong to supplement, where practicable, bilateral request-offer discus-
sions with plurilateral negotiations whose results would then be extended to all WTO Members on an MFN basis.
Such an approach primarily involves groups of WTO members, akin to the numerous “friends” groups that already exist under GATS, to propose a 
set of negotiating objectives in a given sector or in a cluster of sectors. 
The shift towards plurilateral (or collective) discussions at first revealed a paradoxical aversion of developing countries towards considering 
alternatives to the current bilateral approach, even as the latter approach is clearly much more taxing for developing countries than they are for 
developed countries. This is mainly due to: the considerable resources and time bilateral request-offer discussions, the limited number of services 
experts available for bilateral discussions in Geneva missions and in capitals; the negotiating imbalances that flow from the limited ability of most 
developing countries to formulate their own requests; significant asymmetries of negotiating-relevant information available to policy officials; and 
the more limited extent of stakeholder consultations and private sector engagement—and presence abroad—of service suppliers from develop-
ing countries. All of these factors tend not surprisingly to interact in ways that produce least common denominator, precaution-induced, outcomes 
at the negotiating table. Such a stalemate, in turn, complicates attempts at marshalling corporate interest in multilateral negotiations, and tends 
to shift incentives towards bilateral or neighborhood responses in the form of preferential trade agreements.
Collective (plurilateral) approaches are likely to economize on the scarcest of commodities—time and human resources, and afford developing 
countries significant economies of scale in negotiating efforts. Avoiding sector-by-sector and country-by-country bartering of commitments can 
indeed substantially reduce the transaction costs of negotiations. Such requests also offer a useful means for developing countries to pool their 
resources in pursuit of common objectives and indeed to join forces with various country groupings (developed and developing) in ways that can 
build useful reform coalitions in services talks.
A credible case can thus be argued to exist for complementing the current bilateral request-offer approach, which is still of relevance for countries 
with highly specific offensive or defensive interests, with collective approaches to negotiations.Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Box A.7. Concerns Arising in Services Negotiation
Has the government identified specific rule-making issues to which it intends to attach priority importance in the conduct of services negotia- •	
tions?
How adequate are the negotiating skills of the country’s trade and regulatory officials, particularly as regards the capacity to take an active  •	
part in discussions on rule-making issues in services negotiations?
Has the government considered teaming up with other WTO Members or regional partners in formulating proposals and negotiating on selected  •	
rule-making issues?
Has the government considered how best to cooperate with various international organizations, bilateral donors or expert NGOs in formulating  •	
negotiating proposals on selected rule-making, market-opening or development issues?
Has the government considered the pros and cons of participating in collective requests and offers on selected rule-making, thematic or sectoral  •	
issues with a view to overcoming resource constraints and achieve scale economies in the conduct of negotiations?
What role is the government thinking of assigning to Article XVIII (Additional Commitments) of GATS (and PTA equivalents) in sequencing  •	
liberalization undertakings (pre-committing to future opening) and/or addressing sector-specific complements of market opening (for instance, 
government procurement, emergency safeguards, labor mobility-related issues, etc.)?
According to what criteria does the government choose among measures and/or modes of supply, and among sectors that are to be offered as  •	
bound, partially bound, or unbound in the negotiations?
Has a clear distinction been established between defensive and offensive interests in the negotiations? •	
Are the country’s negotiating “red lines” clearly established, and does a process exist to revisit these in the light of developments within and  •	
outside the services negotiations?
Have export interests been identified so as to contribute to the elaboration of a realistic request list? •	
How does the government compile information on foreign barriers affecting the country’s service suppliers? •	
Has a mock request list been elaborated on the basis of existing and/or compiled information? •	
How does the ministry responsible for the conduct of services negotiations seek input from key stakeholders in responding to requests for  •	
market-opening formulated by trading partners?
Do consultations focus primarily on targeted sectors and key domestic suppliers or is an attempt made to weigh the economy-wide implications  •	
of acceding to negotiating requests?
Does the government weigh the pros and cons of binding less than the status quo, notably in terms of the signals such a decision may send  •	
regarding the country’s investment and regulatory climate?
To what extent is the government’s negotiating stance in services, notably as regards the evolution of liberalization offers, informed by—and  •	
coordinated with—the state of play of negotiations in non-service sectors?(continued on next page)
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Box A.8. Examples of Best Practice Capacity Building in Services
The China-EU Trade Project
Between March 2005 and December 2008, the European Union and China have been carrying out a range of bilateral trade in services activities 
involving seminars, studies and visit tours, including the hosting of a Chinese internship program in various EC institutions concerned with trade 
and economic/regulatory matters.
Throughout the period, the project has held the following activities:
14 conferences and seminars were held in China dealing with topics such as: financial services; state treasury management; environment/cli- •	
mate change and financial services; professional licensing in legal services; developing the ITC industry; measures to develop China’s insurance 
and financial markets; civil aviation; competition policy challenges in service industries.
12 studies were carried out dealing with topics such as: domestic regulation; outsourcing of financial services; insurance market openness;  •	
insurance supervision; mergers and acquisitions’ policy in banking services; urban planning of commercial centers; air transportation and the 
GATS; deregulation of the aviation sector; the effects of liberalization in retail distribution services ; and the travel industry; as well as:
7 visit tours of Chinese delegations to the EU dealing with: the regulation of foreign legal consultants; bankruptcy regulations for financial  •	
institutions; payment and settlement systems; the regulation of legal services and services statistics.
Several best practice lessons emerge from the design of the EU-China Trade Project in the services field. For starters, the Project is focusing needed 
policy research attention on the second generation type of implementation challenges arising following WTO accession. For the most part, this 
entails working in close proximity with key regulatory agencies, ministries and the Trade Ministry (MOFCOM) in ensuring that Chinese implement-
ing legislation is fully consistent with WTO law and the country’s accession commitments.
The presence of a large team of experts (approximately fifteen professionals), both Chinese and European, in Beijing greatly facilitates such a 
task and creates indigenous capacity in project management and sectoral knowledge while also favoring greater responsiveness to client needs. 
The Project has notably hired the former Deputy Head of China’s mission to the WTO during the closing phase of the accession negotiations. A 
person of such rank has proven of considerable use in working closely and in confidence with the Chinese bureaucracy. The project team works 
closely with the EC representation in Beijing and typically involves Commission staff, both that working in Beijing and traveling from Brussels, to 
its seminars, conferences and other dialogue activities in China. Such interaction has also facilitated the exchange of policy messages between the 
two partners.
In funding a number of technical studies on a full range of regulatory and sectoral issues, the Project has also sought to associate foreign and 
local experts drawn from leading Chinese universities and research institutions. A similar pairing has been used in organizing various seminars at 
which the main findings of commissioned research are presented and discussed among experts drawn from larger circles in China and abroad.
A final best practice component of the China-EU Trade Project is its emphasis on training. Each year for the past three years, the Project has fully 
funded the participation of two or three MOFCOM staff to follow the year-long MILE (Masters of International Law and Economics) program at the 
World Trade Institute (WTI) in Berne, Switzerland, one of the world’s leading centers of policy research and advanced training in trade regulation. 
Moreover, mindful to secure regulatory compliance by Chinese sub-national (provincial) governments, the China-EU Project has also been funding 
the participation of local officials in the five week Summer Academy held each year at the WTI. In 2007–2008, more than 30 officials from 
provincial governments benefited from advanced training at the Academy.
The Indonesia Trade Assistance Project (ITAP)
The $13.5 million, four year, Indonesia Trade Assistance Project (ITAP) was funded and implemented by USAID during 2004–08. Its delivery was 
outsourced to Chemonics, a leading US development consultancy with wide experience in TRTA/CB.
ITAP focused training efforts on the following key areas: legal support, economic research, public outreach, organizational development, and 
information technology. Delivered by a team of US and local experts working inside the Indonesian Ministry of Trade, the ITAP project aimed 
to improve the Ministry of Trade’s capacity to analyze and implement trade reforms leading to increased exports, a more attractive investment 
climate, and increased employment opportunities for Indonesians.Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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The ITAP has fully funded and overseen the development of a one year Masters’ program in Trade Policy and Negotiations dispensed by the 
country’s leading university (The University of Indonesia) and directed in part towards staff of the Trade Ministry. A full term (15 week) course on 
trade in services has been developed to this end.
A measure of how a locally-anchored CB project of this type may be effective can be derived from the range of activities that ITAP supported. 
These included, among others: (i) Capacity strengthening of Trade Ministry (MoT) staff; (ii) Workshop Series on Economic Research and Trade 
Policy Analysis; (iii) Trade Research Lecture Series; (iv) Mentoring on Economic Research and Trade Policy Analysis; (v) Briefing Sessions for MoT 
staff by ITAP trade economists; (vi) Strengthening the links between MoT and Indonesia’s leading universities and research institutions working 
on trade issues; (vii) Funding, development and delivery by ITAP staff and local academics of a one year Masters of Economics in International 
Trade Policy (MITP) in association with the law and economics faculties at the University of Indonesia; (viii) Specialized training for MoT lawyers 
and legal staff in relevant ministries and regulatory agencies; (ix) launch in 2009 of a new Masters Program on International Trade Law at the 
University of Indonesia; (x) Outreach activities with law schools in the Greater Jakarta area; (xi) Publication of a textbook on WTO law in Bahasa 
Indonesian; (xii) Upgrading the IT facilities and IT staff of the MoT; (xiii) Promotion of public-private dialogue on WTO and Indonesia’s regional 
trade policy.
Source: China-EU Trade Project (2008), and USAID (2008).
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Box A.9. Best Practices in Trade-Related Training: Course Design and Delivery
A number of best practices can be employed in delivering technical training to government officials in the typical short-term course formats within 
which the bulk of TRTA in services is delivered. The purpose of such training is to ensure that the skills and capabilities of staff in trade ministries, 
line ministries or regulatory agencies concerned with trade negotiations and implementation matters are durably upgraded to a higher level. The 
two main areas for providing effective training relate to course design and to course delivery.
The main component of effective design are courses that:
are tied to the Ministry’s strategic vision, mission statements and main functions; •	
are conducted in a location free of distractions from the office; training of less than a week can take place in the capital, but all training should  •	
be outside the office; longer-term training should be located far enough to prevent staff from being called back to the office;
provide participants with training materials that are specifically tailored to the country’s  •	 problématique and the Ministry’s needs;
are coordinated with other training providers to the Ministry, so as to avoid overlaps or substantive inconsistencies; and •	
target the most suitable participants, i.e., those for whom the training is directly relevant. •	
While most training tends to target junior and new professional staff, the training needs of more senior managers often requires attention due to 
the higher expertise of the latter, the greater time pressure they face (especially where trade expertise is scarce and concentrated in a few senior 
hands) and the concomitant reluctance of the latter to engage in training activities. Training for senior staff should always be short, involve fewer 
people and allow close interaction with invited experts.
The main components of effective delivery are training courses that:
require participants to produce outputs (a paper or briefing note for the Minister) relevant to supporting the Ministry achieve its Mission State- •	
ment and Strategic Vision;
provide an interactive format (with case studies, practical exercises and group work) to ensure a better chance of transferring knowledge;  •	
requiring participants to take an active part in the training is the best way to ensure a transfer of knowledge;
are delivered as a series of training courses to incrementally build up the skills and capabilities of participants; this allows participants to apply  •	
their newly-acquired knowledge in the office after each training segment;
are pitched at the right level for the participants; and •	
are delivered if possible in the local language (or at least all training material should be translated into the local language if the training itself  •	
is delivered in a foreign language by international experts).
Source: Indonesian Ministry of Trade Training Needs Assessment: Supporting the Ministry’s Strategic Vision with Training (2007).Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Box A.10. The Implementation Phase of the Services Trade-Negotiation Cycle
Are proposed new and/or improved commitments informed by an assessment of the possible implementation costs (including recurring costs)  •	
relating to regulatory enforcement activities?
Has a proper assessment been made of the capacity-strengthening needs of key regulatory agencies prior to scheduling new and/or improved  •	
commitments?
Has the government given thought to formulating requests of needed capacity-strengthening as a pre-condition or  •	 quid pro quo for new and/or 
improved commitments?
What considerations weigh on the government’s decision to pursue liberalization in a progressive manner and sequence such liberalization with  •	
strengthened regulatory and implementation capacities?
Is the government considering making use of Article XVIII (Additional Commitments) of the GATS (and its PTA equivalents) for purposes of  •	
adopting a sequenced approach linking market opening with a strengthening of regulatory and implementation capacities?
Has an attempt been made to benchmark the country’s regulatory practices and institutions against those of key trading partners or of coun- •	
tries at similar levels of development and regulatory sophistication?
To what extent can regulatory harmonization or the pursuit of mutual recognition initiatives help countries address weakness in domestic  •	
regulatory practices, help overcome the potentially trade-inhibiting effects of regulatory diversity and move domestic regulatory regimes in the 
direction of “best” regional or global practices?
To what extent is the government’s liberalization strategy and its approach to sequencing informed by an ex ante assessment of the possible  •	
social, environmental and/or developmental impacts of market opening?
Is the government confident in its analytical capacity to conduct the various impact assessments linked to service sector liberalization or does it  •	
require dedicated technical assistance to this end?
Have attempts been made to learn from the post-liberalization implementation experience of neighboring countries or countries at similar levels of 
development through targeted training?39
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Box A.11. Strengths and Weakness of Domestic Suppliers
Learn who is exporting which services to what markets and through which mode of supply
A major purpose of negotiations is to strengthen the competitive positioning of a country’s services exporters. If a government is unaware of its 
economy’s competitive strengths, it could inadvertently ignore or undermine them at the negotiating table. Developing economies in particular of-
ten assume that little export activity is occurring in services markets. Yet, research by the International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO) has indicated 
that many developing countries’ firms export more than 40 different types of services to a range of export markets. Developing countries may thus 
have greater export interests and potential in trade in services than is often recognized to date by governments conducting the negotiations.
Learn what will make a competitive difference for service firms
To develop negotiating positions, governments need to know what non-tariff or regulatory obstacles their service exporters are encountering (by 
mode of supply), both in their sector and in related sectors. They also need to determine priority export markets for the “request” process. This 
latter issue is challenging as the global competitive environment for services is rapidly changing, and service exporters typically operate in a wider 
range of markets than do goods exporters. Since it is easiest to enter a new service market if the firm has an advocate who knows the quality 
of the service being provided, important export markets include those from which foreign investors have come, those with significant expatriate 
populations, those that are common travel destinations, and those with whom there are economic integration agreements.
Determine the role played by service imports and how to ensure economic benefits from more liberal market access
The competitiveness of all domestic enterprises, as well as the quality of life for citizens, depends on the type and quality of service inputs avail-
able to them. Having the option to import can provide a competitive incentive to improve quality and availability. In addition, foreign firms that 
choose to establish local offices may create jobs and generate other positive spillovers, most notably in terms of improved product standards, 
better access to distributional channels, etc.
Build domestic support for liberalization of services trade, by identifying and partnering with national  
“champions” that have become successful exporters
Perhaps because services agreements are complex initiatives that deal with many issues that affect people’s quality of life, they often become 
international focal points for broader concerns about globalization. Several civil society voices have expressed recurring concerns that services trade 
rules may infringe on domestic regulatory sovereignty, disrupt basic services (such as education, health, utilities), favor foreign over domestic 
interests, and limit environmental obligations. Such criticisms often overlook both the degree of choice involved in making sectoral commitments 
under trade agreements like the GATS and the actual role of service firms in creating the vast majority of new jobs. It is important to foster an 
informed public debate about services liberalization, including by creating opportunities for a dialogue between service exporters (especially small 
and very small firms) and representatives of relevant public interest groups. Identifying and partnering with firms, including small firms, that have 
become successful exporters of services, can he helpful in addressing the legitimate public policy concerns that negotiations in areas characterized 
by high regulatory intensity and particular policy sensitivities can generate.
Source: OECD (2002).Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Box A.12. Organizing Services Coalitions in Developing Countries
The integration of services in the multilateral trading system during the Uruguay Round and the subsequent liberalization processes which have 
followed at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, have alerted major private sector stakeholders, particularly in developed countries, to 
the necessity of monitoring these processes and influencing rules and negotiated outcomes to their advantage. 
A need has arisen in a number of countries to establish organized services-related private sector advocacy groups that would be mandated by 
industry associations and enterprises to lobby relevant government and non-government constituencies and voice corporate interests and concerns 
on services trade matters. 
In this context, the private sector in some developed countries took the lead in creating coalitions of service industries, which were designed to 
serve as umbrella organizations, or informal networks, that share a common interest over the development of service industries, and to strategically 
represent the voice of the industry and bring together service firms and business associations to discuss and strategize on policy issues of interest.
Although some of the coalitions established in developed countries were born prior to or during the course of the Uruguay Round, the majority of 
the existing coalitions were created after the conclusion of the Round. Most of these coalitions operate through small and flexible secretariats. They 
tend to represent the interests of larger services enterprises, whose views and interests may not always concur with those of small and medium 
sized enterprises. However, the latter’s interests can readily be taken into consideration throughout their affiliation with sectoral services associa-
tion which are members of larger coalitions. The majority of the coalitions are purely driven by private sector companies with no institutional 
role played by their respective governments. This enables the coalitions to freely discuss and coordinate their positions, independently formulate 
policies and undertake activities in a manner that reflects their sole interests.
Existing coalitions are more visible in high income countries. This can be attributed to a host of factors, including the lack of awareness in many 
developing countries of the important role of services in their respective economies; the prevalence of forces that are not supportive of public-
private collaboration and that are unwilling to endorse the concept of institutionalizing private sector policy lobbying mechanisms; as well as 
a lack of adequate funding.
Very few existing coalitions are solely dedicated to advancing their members’ interests in regional and multilateral trade negotiations. In almost 
all cases, mandates encompass objectives of a more domestic nature such as: establishing internal databases on possible export opportunities in 
foreign markets; improvement of statistical measurement of service sector data, and encouraging governments to implement domestic economic, 
fiscal and monetary policies most conducive to a service-friendly environment; and assisting in enhancing public and private awareness on the 
strategic economic and social role of service sectors.
Policy Lobbying by Service Coalitions: Impact on Trade Policy Formulation
Service sector coalitions from developed countries tend to have significantly wider mandates and, consequently, a more extensive sphere of inter-
est and constituencies than their developing country counterparts.. While the latter’s sphere of lobbying has been limited to their own govern-
mental constituencies, the concerns of the former typically encompass legislative constituencies, government constituencies in foreign markets and 
other stakeholders. Also, some member companies in developed country coalitions enjoy considerable political weight in their own right, owing to 
their size and global presence.
Due to their higher level of financial and human resource capacity and sophistication, developed country coalitions are generally more active and 
aggressive in lobbying their own national constituencies, sustained in many instances by institutionalized two-way consultation processes. Some 
developed country coalitions have come to realize that, in order to effectively attain their export interests in foreign markets, it is important for 
their own governments to adequately address the export interests of their trading partners.
This is most apparent in the case of the US Coalition of Service Industries (CSI), which has for years exerted determined efforts to lobby USTR and 
the Congress towards easing trade restrictions in areas of export interests to their trading partners in services and non-services related areas in the 
context of the WTO negotiations. In return, US trading partners may become more encouraged or engaged to open their own services markets in 
sectors of export interest to CSI members. 
Service industry coalitions are not the sole private sector player in voicing the interests of the industry in multilateral and preferential trade 
negotiations. Other national, regional and international lobbies play an important role although their inputs generally tackle services in a more 
comprehensive manner encompassing other tracks of trade negotiations such as agricultural and non-agricultural goods. Among the most active of 
such lobbies, at the international level, is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).41
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It remains highly difficult to empirically document the influence that service industry coalitions exert on services trade liberalization. There is 
however significant anecdotal evidence suggesting that such coalitions are among the most effective forces influencing government positions 
vis-à-vis services trade negotiations. The results of the lobbying activities of the coalitions may be more significant in bilateral and regional trade 
negotiations in which, unlike the multilateral trade process, member states may have greater leverage, address policy concerns over shorter time 
frames and pursue what are often more narrowly-defined trade, investment and regulatory objectives with partner countries. 
Future Challenges and Opportunities
Service sector coalitions face several key challenges, among which: (i) the heterogeneous nature of the service sector and, occasionally, conflict-
ing inter-sectoral interests that derive from such diversity, which heightens the challenge to coordinate among the various sectoral positions 
within such coalitions; (ii) the ongoing backlash against globalization, which often targets the alleged dangers of service sector liberalization for 
domestic policy space, social security, employment or access to public services; (iii) the occasional adverse implications of the lobbying role played 
by influential non-service private sector players, which have succeeded, in some instances, in focusing their respective governments’ attention on 
other economic sectors, notably agriculture, regardless of these sectors’ importance (relative to services) in their economies; and (iv) the ongoing 
burden on the coalitions to adequately explain and draw attention to the importance of the services sector in formulating trade policies. The latter 
challenge tends to be compounded by budgetary constraints. However, despite the above challenges and the fact that are yet few developing 
country coalitions established to represent the voice of the services industry in relevant fora, one may expect that the number and organizational 
quality of services industry coalitions will keep increasing, due to the following factors:
(i) the rapidly growing importance of services in the economies of developed and developing countries, and the increasing appreciation, therefore, 
of the vital role of service businesses in shaping economic policy making and international trade trends; (ii) the mounting appetite of national 
and multinational service industries to organize themselves in order to enhance their ability in exploring new export markets and develop strong 
lobbies able to influence national, regional and multilateral trade policies; (iii) the integration of more services-related trade and investment rules 
and liberalization commitments in bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements, and (iv) The increasing role played by existing coalitions, 
mainly from developed countries, in assisting in the establishment of similar coalitions in the developing world, through sharing their experience 
on organizational and policy lobbying aspects.
In the latter regard, international organizations can play a vital capacity building role. This is notably the case of the ITC which, through its 
“World Trade Net” initiative, is providing support to services industry communities in developing countries to become institutionally organized, in 
order to effectively express their interests and objectives.
Source: Ragui El-Etreby(2008).
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Box A.13. Providing Market Intelligence to Developing Country Suppliers:  
The Trade Facilitation Office of Canada
Established by the Canadian International Development Agency in 1980, the Trade Facilitation Office of Canada (TFO)21 is a not for profit corpora-
tion whose mandate is to assist exporters from developing countries and transition economies in securing greater access to the Canadian market 
by offering them practical exporting advice, market information and exposure in the Canadian marketplace through various promotional activities.
The TFO’s main services comprise: (i) Canadian Market Information Services, a web-based source of information on export requirements and mar-
ket intelligence targeted at developing county SMEs. On a fee paying basis, the TFO also provides exporters with customized market development 
consulting services, information seminars, trade missions, etc. The TFO also publishes an electronic newsletter containing sourcing information 
for would-be exporters to Canada; (ii) Trade-Readiness Capacity Building Services, which focuses on training and the implementation of trade 
development projects with local partners in order to develop the know-how of developing country exporters and strengthen trade support and 
investment attraction institutions in developing countries.
While the TFO’s experience in the services field remains limited, it has most recently begun to devote closer attention to the sector with a view 
to developing a range of service offerings tailored to the sector and aimed at helping developing country exporters, particularly SMEs, better 
understand the fragmented nature of the Canadian market for services, gain a greater foothold in it as well as reach out to Canadian consumers 
(through Mode 2 trade (e.g., consumption abroad) in areas such as health-related tourism and wellness. The TFO has also recently completed 
its first Market Report on the Canadian Service Sector, focusing particular attention to the tourism sector and to a number of business services. 
The Report is intended to provide developing country suppliers with background information on the services sector in Canada in order to facilitate 
efforts in: (i) developing a strategy for entering the Canadian market; (ii) understanding the complex nature of the services industry in Canada; 
(iii) recognizing the real costs involved with entering this market; and (iv) finding additional information from other sources before entering the 
market.
The TFO occupies a unique and potentially very helpful niche in private sector development. Canadian negotiators have recently begun to make its 
services known to its trading partners, particularly PTA partners, with a view to signaling the early attention that Canada wishes to pay to services 
issues and sectors of priority interest to its developing country trade partners.
For fuller information on the activities of the TFO, see 
21  www.tfocanada.ca43
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Box A.14. Strengthening the Supply-Side Capacity of  
Developing Country Exporters
What forms of advisory services and training opportunities have been developed to assist in strengthening trade and investment promotion  •	
organizations and private companies in developing countries?
How can detailed information best be supplied on the regulatory regimes prevailing in the specific service sectors of developed and emerging  •	
country markets of interest to developing country exporters of services?
Have online databases and electronic meeting places been developed to facilitate interaction between service suppliers in developing countries  •	
and companies in developed markets that may be seeking to outsource work or find partners?
What are the most efficient ways of making market intelligence on developed and emerging country service markets and export opportunities  •	
available to services exporters in developing countries?
What steps have been taken to promote b2b dialogue and enhance access to distribution channels in the services markets of developed and  •	
emerging economies?
What forms of assistance, including by private companies, is best able to help developing country firms enhance quality standards and more  •	
easily meet host country certification and licensing requirements?
What forms of assistance are available or should be developed to help developing country firms or industry associations take part in the activi- •	
ties of standards-making bodies in service industries?
What training and technical assistance is needed to help industry providers, industry associations or licensing bodies in developing countries  •	
participate in part in and benefit from mutual recognition agreements designed to facilitate trade and overcome the potentially trade-impairing 
aspects of regulatory diversity?
What forms of assistance are best able to nurture the emergence and sustain the existence of coalitions of services industries in developing  •	
countries?
What funding opportunities exist to help small service exporting firms from developing economies take part in trade missions to developed and  •	
emerging country markets as well as buying missions for services importers from developed countries?
How can leading developed and emerging country suppliers of services be made to share their expertise on service sector R&D, access to  •	
finance, quality control, recognition, etc.?
What steps are needed to strengthen the ability of service sector SMEs to fund their growth and development, including in export markets? •	
What special mechanisms or funds could be created to provide funding at affordable interest rates to services SMEs? •	
How can financial institutions in developing countries be encouraged to overcome their aversion to lend to service sector firms with limited  •	
physical capital and significant intangible assets?Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Box A.15. Addressing aid for trade in services: the EU-CARIFORUM Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA)
The co-operation elements of the EPA mark the attempt by EU Member states to infuse the Agreement with a concrete development dimension. In 
so doing, the EPA charts new territory at a time when the multilateral community is struggling to give operational meaning to the concept of Aid 
for Trade. Part I of the EPA, which focuses on a Trade Partnership for Sustainable Development, provides the umbrella provisions on development. 
However, more issue- and sector-specific development cooperation provisions can be found in all of the EPAs various Titles.
Part I of the EPA states that development co-operation can take financial and non-financial forms. Further, Article 7(3) clarifies the relationship 
between the EPA and the Cotonou Agreement by providing that EC financing is to be carried out according to the framework of rules and relevant 
procedures provided for in the Cotonou Agreement, in particular the programming procedures of the European Development Fund (EDF) and within 
the framework of relevant instruments by the General Budget of the European Union.
The EPA text does not feature explicit language on the level of development financing made available overall or for the specific issues and sectors 
subject to the Agreement’s coverage. This has sparked much criticism throughout the CARIFORUM region over the allegedly unbalanced nature of 
the Agreement insofar as its development provisions remain somewhat abstract and not legally enforceable, while its liberalization commit-
ments are up-front, legally binding and enforceable. Responding to such critiques, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) has 
cautioned that any perceptions about the EPA’s practical deficiencies with respect to the treatment of development and development cooperation 
and assistance should first be tempered by the recognition that, as a trade agreement, the EPA should not be perceived to be the primary vehicle 
through which development may be achieved. Rather, it should be considered as one strategic instrument in a range of economic development 
strategies.
According to the Joint Declaration on Development Co-operation appended to the EPA, a package of €165 million has been set aside for the 
next six years to fund trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) and capacity building (CB) activities identified and rank-ordered in the Caribbean’s 
regional indicative plan (RIP). This regional package includes an incentive tranche of €32 million for adhering to principles of good governance, 
democracy and the rule of law. Of the €165 million being made available, CARIFORUM states have indicated that the region intended to devote 
thirty percent of the RIP and the full amount of the incentive tranche to issues of EPA implementation. In addition to funding for the regional 
indicative plan, each CARIFORUM state will receive funds for its national indicative plan (NIP) but must identify two priority projects for such ad-
ditional funding. The Dominican Republic and Jamaica have already announced that they will be using the financing under their respective NIPs 
for purposes of EPA implementation.
The development priorities identified in Part I of the EPA include the provision of: (i) technical assistance to build, human, legal and institutional 
capacity in the CARIFORUM states in order to facilitate compliance with the commitments of the EPA; (ii) assistance for capacity building and 
institution building for fiscal reform; (iii) the provision of support measures aimed at promoting private sector and enterprise development; 
(iv) the diversification of CARIFORUM exports of goods and services through investment and the development of new sectors; (v) enhancing the 
technological and research capabilities of the CARIFORUM states so as to facilitate the adoption of and compliance with internationally recognized 
SPS measures, technical standards and labor and environmental standards; (vi) the development of CARIFORUM innovation systems; and (vii) the 
development of infrastructure in support of trade.
In the context of the EPA’s Investment, Services and E-Commerce Title, the generic cooperation provisions are complemented by a few sector 
specific cooperation provisions, the most developed being those agreed for the tourism sector. The cooperation activities foreseen under the title 
are premised on the belief that trade-related technical assistance and capacity building are important elements in complementing the liberaliza-
tion of services and investment, supporting the CARIFORUM states’ effort to strengthen their capacity in the supply of services and facilitating the 
implementation of scheduled commitments.
Subject to the provisions of Article 7, which speaks directly to the question of development financing, the specific cooperation envisaged includes 
providing support for technical assistance, training and capacity building in a number of areas. These include: (i) improving the ability of 
CARIFORUM service suppliers to gather information on and meet regulations and standards of the EC Parties; (ii) improving the export capacity of 
local service suppliers; (iii) facilitating interaction and dialogue between service suppliers of both Parties; (iv) addressing quality and standards 
in needs in those areas where the CARIFORUM states have undertaken commitments; (v) developing and implementing regulatory regimes for 
specific services at the CARIFORUM level and in the signatory CARIFORUM states; (vi) establishing mechanisms for promoting investment and joint 
ventures between service suppliers of the Parties; and (vii) enhancing the capacities of investment promotion agencies in CARIFORUM states.45
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An additional feature of the EPA’s development dimension is the establishment of a regional development fund (RDF). According to EPA Article 
8(3), the RDF will be used to mobilize and channel EPA-related development resources from the European Development Fund and other potential 
donors. The Parties have agreed that the CARIFORUM states are to endeavor to establish the fund within two years of the date of signature of the 
Agreement. One of the aims of the RDF is to increase the speed at which funds are disbursed to the CARIFORUM countries.
Source: P. Sauvé and N. Ward (2008).
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Table A.1. Sample List of Exporters and Other Domestic Stakeholders in 
Selected Service Sectors
Small & large national firms 
who sell by each mode TNC 
subsidiaries (Mode 3) Govern-
ment agencies Non-profit 
organizations
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
Professional services associations
Professional licensing registrars
Service Industry associations
Real Estate Board
Convention Board
National Research Council 
Unions
Service industry associations
Telecommunications regulator
National Film Board
National News Service
Unions
Producers in other sectors which consume these services
Construction Association
Engineering Association
Architectural Association
Housing Authority
Environmental Impact
Safety Standards
Unions
Producers in other sectors which consume these services
Retailers Association
Wholesalers Association
Importers Association
Franchise Association
Duty-Free Shops
Unions
Teachers Unions
Association of Private Educational Institutions
Association of Community Colleges
Career Guidance Association
Student Associations
Environmental services association
Trade unions
Environmental NGOs
Producers in other sectors which consume these services
Consumer groups
Business services
Communication services
Construction & related 
engineering services
Distribution services
Education and training 
services
Environmental services
Exporters Other Stakeholders GATS SectorSource: OECD (2002).
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Table A.1. Sample List of Exporters and Other Domestic Stakeholders in 
Selected Service Sectors (continued)
Exporters
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
Utility companies
Energy trading companies
Other Stakeholders
Bankers Association
Brokers Association
Insurance Association
Central Bank/Finance Ministry
Security Exchange/Stock Market
Securities Regulator
Unions
Producers in other sectors which consume these services
Hospital Association
Outpatient Clinics Association
Health advocates
Social welfare advocates
Unions
Major sports team managers
National museum
National library and archives
National performing arts groups
Coalitions of domestic film-makers
Council for the Arts
Unions
Travel agencies’ association
Tour guides association
Hotel association
Restaurant association
Parks Authority
Environmental Impact Agency
Unions
Airport Authority
Air Traffic Controllers Association
Port Authority
Vehicle licensing authority
Unions
Producers in other sectors which consume these services
Utility regulators
Industry associations (including from other sectors which consume these 
services)
User/consumer advocates
Environmental NGOs 
Unions
GATS Sector
Financial services
Health-related & social 
services 
Recreational, cultural, 
entertainment & sporting 
services
Tourism and travel-
related services
Transport services
Other (energy services)Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries
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Table A.2. Factors to Consider in Formulating a Request or Offer 
More efficient use of resources •	
Attract more foreign investment •	
Expanded job opportunities; reduced “brain drain” •	
Enhanced labor force skills •	
Increased foreign exchange earnings •	
Increased tax revenues •	
Economic diversification •	
Increased services efficiency •	
Increased technology transfer •	
Increased economic growth throughout the  •	
economy
Lower prices for services (leading to a better  •	
standard of living; greater purchasing power)
Better quality of service (including convenience,  •	
responsiveness, timeliness)
Greater choice; new services offerings •	
Determine the impact on domestic economic  •	
performance and regulatory conduct of various 
levels of policy binding (e.g., below the status 
quo, status quo, pre-commitment to future 
liberalization)
Ensure good quality services •	
Ensure adequate infrastructure for business  •	
activities
Assess impact of market opening on scope for  •	
achieving universal service supply/access objec-
tives, particularly for the poor and/or geographi-
cally disadvantaged 
Need to improve environmental stewardship and  •	
address possible adverse environmental impacts 
arising from liberalization
Ensure ability to regulate according to best  •	
international practices where feasible and  enforce 
regulatory regimes  adequately
Restrict the scope for illegal activities •	
Maintain a stable political and economic environ- •	
ment
Adequate means of disciplining the potential anti- •	
competitive conduct of dominant firms (domestic 
and foreign)
Can competition policy play a larger role in disci- •	
plining market conduct post-liberalization?
Ensure adequate tax revenues for the government •	
Ensure adequate resources to address labor force  •	
retraining needs, particularly vis-à-vis employees 
in state-owned enterprises
Assess impact of market opening on scope for  •	
achieving universal service supply/access objec-
tives, particularly for the poor and/or geographi-
cally disadvantaged 
Ensure adequacy, reliability and  quality of public  •	
services
Safeguard consumer rights, and provide redress  •	
for complaints
Ensure sensitivity to local needs •	
Country/
economy in general
Consumers
 
Possible benefits
Concerns to be addressed, including  
by regulatory reform
 
GroupSource: OECD (2002).
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Table A.2. Factors to Consider in Formulating a Request or Offer (continued)
Lower costs of doing business; increased profit- •	
ability
Ready availability of capital; reduced cost of funds •	
Greater ability to own & dispose of assets •	
Fewer foreign exchange limits; ability to repatriate  •	
profits
Infusion of new technologies and innovation •	
Greater adherence to international standards •	
Enhanced scope for mergers and strategic alli- •	
ances
Remove red tape; increase transparency regarding  •	
domestic regulatory requirements 
Access to skilled labor and expertise (locally &  •	
from abroad)
Access to larger markets •	
Access to cheaper service inputs, increasing ef- •	
ficiency and competitiveness
Allow local firms to recoup initial investments •	
Encourage reinvestment in improved services •	
Ensure the growth of local enterprises •	
Ensure acceptance of locally-produced services •	
Encourage adoption of/compliance with interna- •	
tional standards
Ensure availability of appropriately-skilled workers •	
Ensure disclosure of financial information by  •	
foreign firms
Ensure financing at competitive rates •	
Ensure effective professional (service industry)  •	
associations
 
Possible benefits
Concerns to be addressed, including  
by regulatory reform
 
Group
Business services51
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